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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF MEDICARE PART D ON MORTALITY AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 
 
Using the Health and Retirement Study Panel core files from 1996 to 2014, I 
analyze how Medicare Part D impacted access to prescription drug coverage by various 
demographic factors such as race, gender, and income. In Chapter 1, I find the highest 
take-up rates for those who were white, female, and with higher incomes. However, 
increases in coverage were high across the board, such that Medicare Part D also 
improved drug insurance coverage for those who were black, male, and with lower 
income. Thus, although Medicare Part D did increase prescription drug insurance 
coverage for seniors across the board, I also find potential for improvement in enrollment 
for difficult-to-reach groups. 
Next, Chapter 2 examines the impact of Medicare Part D on mortality. Although I 
do not find an impact on the life expectancy of respondents as a whole, I do find a 
significant positive effect for black respondents, indicating that Medicare Part D may 
have mattered more for disadvantaged groups. The largest impact is for black men, who 
have an additional 9 percentage point chance of living to age 73 for an additional 8 years 
of coverage (significant at the 5% level). When looking only at cardiovascular mortality, 
which is more likely to be influenced by drug coverage, I find improvements in life 
expectancy for the total population, with stronger effects for minorities and men. Overall, 
my findings suggest that Medicare Part D did move the needle on its goal: to improve the 
health of those who, without government intervention, had the most difficulty paying for 
prescription drugs. 
Chapter 3 looks at the impact of Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage on 
cost-related medication adherence, food insecurity, and finances among seniors. It would 
be reasonable to assume that Medicare Part D, which led to near-universal drug coverage 
among senior citizens, could allow seniors to shift money previously spent on drug 
expenditures to other areas. The strongest effect of Medicare Part D is on cost-related 
medication nonadherence, leading to a 21% decrease for an additional 8 years of 
     
 
Medicare Part D coverage. The impact is even stronger for the black male population 
(30%). I fail to reject the null hypothesis that Medicare Part D did not reduce food 
insecurity or household debt. Overall, Medicare Part D appears to have improved the 
financial stability of seniors. 
 
KEYWORDS: Medicare Part D; Health Insurance; Life Expectancy; Racial Disparities  
 
 
 
 
 
Katherine Toran 
 
 
July 25, 2019 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF MEDICARE PART D ON MORTALITY AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 
 
 
By 
Katherine Toran 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Aaron Yelowitz 
Director of Dissertation 
 
Dr. Josh Ederington 
Director of Graduate Studies 
 
07/25/2019 
            Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am grateful for the guidance, comments, and help provided by my Dissertation 
Chair, Dr. Aaron Yelowitz, in the writing of this dissertation. I thank the members of my 
dissertation committee, Drs. John Garen, Christopher Bollinger, and Hefei Wen, and my 
outside examiner Dr. William Gerken, for their comments, contributions, and feedback. 
Also, I would like to thank Dr. James P. Ziliak and Dr. Craig Gundersen for granting me 
permission to use summary statistics from their 2018 paper on “The state of senior hunger 
in America 2016: An annual report.” This work has also benefited greatly from the 
collegiality and attention of faculty members and other graduate students in the 
Department of Economics at the University of Kentucky. I thank the Institute for the Study 
of Free Enterprise for the fellowship support during the writing of this dissertation. A 
number of people have contributed to my success through their support and 
encouragement. I am especially grateful for the mentoring offered by Monica Saavoss 
during my summer internship at the Economic Research Service. Finally, I thank my 
parents for their support throughout my graduate student career. 
iv 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 1. Did Medicare Part D Improve Racial Disparities in Healthcare? ....... 1 
1.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Literature Review .................................................................................................... 3 
1.2.1 Demographic Factors Impacting Drug Coverage ........................................... 4 
1.2.2 Total Health Insurance Coverage .................................................................... 8 
1.3 Data......................................................................................................................... 8 
1.3.1 Variables of Interest ........................................................................................ 9 
1.4 Summary Statistics ................................................................................................ 10 
1.4.1 Elderly Drug Coverage ................................................................................. 10 
1.4.2 Landscape Prior to Medicare Part D—How the Elderly Obtained Drug 
Coverage Before and After Part D ............................................................................ 12 
1.4.3 Coverage by Income and Assets ................................................................... 15 
1.5 Results ................................................................................................................... 17 
1.5.1 Theoretical Predictions ................................................................................. 17 
1.5.2 Part D’s Take-up by Demographic Factors .................................................. 18 
1.6 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 22 
CHAPTER 2. Does Medicare Part D Extend Lives—Medicare Part D and 
Mortality………………………………………………………………………………...33 
2.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 33 
2.2 Literature Review .................................................................................................. 37 
2.2.1 Importance of Prescription Drugs to Health of Elderly ................................ 38 
2.2.2 Demographic Factors Impacting Drug Coverage ......................................... 40 
2.2.3 Contribution .................................................................................................. 42 
2.3 Data....................................................................................................................... 44 
2.3.1 Variables of Interest ...................................................................................... 44 
2.3.2 Generating Variables .................................................................................... 47 
2.4 Summary Statistics ................................................................................................ 51 
2.4.1 Changes in Elderly Drug Coverage .............................................................. 51 
v 
 
2.5 Theoretical Predictions ......................................................................................... 52 
2.5.1 Medicare Part D’s Impact by Demographic Factors..................................... 52 
2.5.2 Should Medicare Part D Impact Mortality? .................................................. 53 
2.6 Main Results.......................................................................................................... 54 
2.6.1 Regressions ................................................................................................... 54 
2.6.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis ................................................................................... 59 
2.6.3 Robustness Checks........................................................................................ 63 
2.6.4 Placebo Test .................................................................................................. 64 
2.7 Additional Results ................................................................................................. 66 
2.7.1 Cox Proportional Hazards Model ................................................................. 71 
2.8 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 74 
CHAPTER 3. Medicare Part D and Financial Insecurity ........................................... 92 
3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 92 
3.2 Literature Review .................................................................................................. 93 
3.2.1 Differential Impact by Demographic Factors ............................................... 98 
3.2.2 Contribution .................................................................................................. 99 
3.3 Data..................................................................................................................... 100 
3.3.1 Identification ............................................................................................... 101 
3.3.2 Generating Variables .................................................................................. 102 
3.4 Summary Statistics .............................................................................................. 102 
3.5 Theoretical Predictions ....................................................................................... 108 
3.6 Results ................................................................................................................. 108 
3.7 Robustness Checks .............................................................................................. 115 
3.8 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 117 
APPENDIX A: Chapter 1 Appendix ........................................................................... 131 
REFERENCES: For Chapter 1 ................................................................................... 133 
REFERENCES: For Chapter 2 ................................................................................... 140 
REFERENCES: For Chapter 3 ................................................................................... 150 
VITA............................................................................................................................... 154 
 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1: Percent of Seniors with Health Insurance Coverage using Various Sources .. 24 
Table 1.2: Percent of Seniors with Drug Coverage Using Outside Data .......................... 25 
Table 1.3: Percent of Sample with Drug Coverage .......................................................... 25 
Table 1.4: Elderly Drug Coverage by Household Income ................................................ 26 
Table 1.5: Elderly Drug Coverage by Household Assets ................................................. 26 
Table 1.6: Mean Drug Coverage for Elderly Before and After Part D ............................. 27 
Table 1.7: Respondent Characteristics in 2004 by Type of Prescription Drug Coverage in 
2004................................................................................................................................... 28 
Table 1.8: How much selection into Part D was there? Respondent with no coverage in 
2004 by prescription drug insurance coverage in 2006 .................................................... 29 
Table 1.9: Two Random Effects Regressions of Demographic Factors Against 
Prescription Drug Coverage, Before and After Part D. .................................................... 30 
Table 2.1: Percent of Sample Still Alive at Age 73 by Birth Year ................................... 76 
Table 2.2: Demographics by Birth Year ........................................................................... 77 
Table 2.3: Categories of Drug Coverage Before and After Part D ................................... 80 
Table 2.4: Impact of Part D Coverage on Living to Age 73 ............................................. 81 
Table 2.5: Impact of Part D Coverage on Probability of Living to Age 73 for Only Black 
Male Respondents ............................................................................................................. 82 
Table 2.6: Impact of Part D Coverage on Living to 73 For Respondents Across Race ... 83 
Table 2.7: Impact of Part D Coverage on Living to 66-73 ............................................... 84 
Table 2.8: Impact of Part D Coverage on Living to 66-73 for Only Black Men .............. 84 
Table 2.9: Alternative Specifications for Measuring the Impact of Part D Coverage on 
Probability of Living to 73 for Only Black Men .............................................................. 84 
Table 2.10: Placebo Test Looking at the Impact of Birth Year Cohort 1925 to 1930 on 
Probability of Living to Age 73 ........................................................................................ 85 
Table 2.11: Cause of Death Across All Years: Percent in Each Category ....................... 86 
vii 
 
Table 2.12: Percent of Total Deaths Caused by Heart, Circulatory and Blood Conditions
........................................................................................................................................... 87 
Table 2.13: Impact of Part D Coverage on Cardiovascular Mortality at Age 73 for Total 
Population ......................................................................................................................... 88 
Table 2.14: Impact of Part D on Cardiovascular Mortality at Age 73 for Only Black Male 
Respondents ...................................................................................................................... 89 
Table 2.15: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Dying, Total Population ..... 90 
Table 2.16: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Dying for Black Male 
Population ......................................................................................................................... 91 
Table 3.1: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Cost-related Medication 
Nonadherence ................................................................................................................. 119 
Table 3.2: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Food Insecurity .................. 120 
Table 3.3: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Household Debt.................. 121 
Table 3.4: Placebo Test on Total Population .................................................................. 122 
 
viii 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1: Percent of Seniors (Over Age 65) With Drug Coverage ................................ 32 
Figure 1.2: Categories of Drug Coverage ......................................................................... 32 
Figure 3.1: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Cost-related Medication Nonadherence (in 
Last Two Years) Among Seniors, 2002-2014 ................................................................ 123 
Figure 3.2: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Food Stamp Usage (in Last Two Years) 
Among Seniors, 1998-2014 ............................................................................................ 124 
Figure 3.3: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Food Insecurity (Did Not Have Enough 
Money to Buy Food in Last Two Years) Among Seniors, 1996-2014 ........................... 125 
Figure 3.4: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Cost-related Medication Nonadherence (in 
Last Two Years) Among Black Seniors, 2002-2014 ...................................................... 126 
Figure 3.5: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Food Insecurity (Did Not Have Enough 
Money to Buy Food in Last Two Years) Among Black Seniors, 1996-2014................. 127 
Figure 3.6: Trends in Food Insecurity for Total U.S. Population ................................... 128 
Figure 3.7: Trends in Food Insecurity Among Senior Americans (Over Age 60) ......... 129 
Figure 3.8: Ratio of Odds Ratios for the Financial Security of Seniors Before and After 
Medicare Part D .............................................................................................................. 130 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1.  DID MEDICARE PART D IMPROVE RACIAL DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE? 
1.1 Introduction 
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 created Medicare Part D in order to 
alleviate the burden of drug expenditures on the elderly population. During the original 
creation of Medicare in 1965, an outpatient prescription drug benefit in Part B was 
considered and dropped because of fears of high costs, as well as oppositional lobbying 
from the American Medical Association (Oliver et al. 2004). Instead, public hospital drug 
provision programs aided the less well-off. However, as drug costs became an increasing 
share of public expenditures, these programs were strained to keep up (Flaer et al. 2008). 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, prescription drug expenditures grew twice as rapidly as all 
other health care spending (Duggan 2005). Furthermore, Duggan and Morton (2010) 
found that three years prior to Part D in 2003, seniors paid about $1,789 on drugs per 
year, with more than half of this spending out-of-pocket and just 7.8 percent covered by 
Medicare. 
Utilization of drugs was also on the rise. Schur (2004) reported that “Between 
1977 and 1998, the proportion of Americans taking at least one prescription rose from 58 
to 66 percent and the average number of prescriptions per person more than doubled.” 
Papers such as Poisal and Murray (2001) highlighted how Medicare beneficiaries without 
drug coverage reported less drug use and how out-of-pocket spending on drugs had 
increased for all seniors. According to Safran et al. (2002), before Part D 23% of seniors 
reported spending more than $100 per month on prescription drugs. Furthermore, among 
seniors without drug coverage, 43% spent more than $100 monthly. Rising drug costs for 
seniors due to medical advancement drove the creation of Part D. The primary purpose of 
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Medicare Part D was to provide universal access to drugs for seniors who needed them 
(Neuman et al. 2009). 
Policymakers intended Medicare Part D to reduce disparities between 
beneficiaries of different income levels (Poisal and Murray 2001) as well as discrepancies 
between drug coverage across states (Safran et al. 2002). In a speech to the N.A.A.C.P., 
President Bush bragged of Medicare Part D’s provisions to cover the costs of drugs for 
the poorest seniors (Stolberg 2006). However, those who opposed the bill such as Senator 
Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) argued that it was an inadequate benefit which would 
fail to control drug prices (Karl et al. 2003). Neuman et al. (2007) found that take-up of 
Part D was negatively correlated with being African-American, rural residence, and 
poverty, matching with my own findings below. Thus, focusing on how Medicare 
improved drug insurance coverage rates for the most disadvantaged groups is an 
important criterion to assess the program’s effectiveness. 
After 2006, individuals had the option of retaining their existing coverage or 
purchasing a Part D drug plan separately or through Medicare Advantage/HMO. For 
those who could not afford any plan, the low-income subsidy covered part or all of their 
insurance. For Medicare Part D to be as efficient as possible in terms of improving health 
at the lowest cost, take-up of Part D plans would need to be dominated by those who 
previously did not have coverage, not those switching from existing plans to something 
cheaper. However, Abaluck and Gruber (2011) find that seniors did not always pick the 
plans which maximized their welfare. 
As shown in Figure 1.1, Medicare Part D increased prescription drug coverage 
among seniors by almost 15%, from around 75% to 90%. This could be considered close 
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to universal coverage, since those who did not take-up coverage because of good health 
dominated those who did not take-up (Levy and Weir 2010). 
My contribution is to focus in particular on the racial gap in healthcare between 
black and white Americans, and also to assess to what extent Medicare Part D was 
effective at reaching those who needed it the most. 
1.2  Literature Review 
Levy and Weir (2010) look at the impact of Medicare Part D shortly after its 
inception. Like my own paper, they use the Health and Retirement Survey. They estimate 
that 50%–60% of seniors without drug coverage took up Part D coverage in 2006, 
increasing total prescription drug coverage by 17%. Thus, coverage rose to 93% of 
seniors. Similarly, Heiss et al. (2010) and Neuman et al. (2009) find 90% coverage rates 
after Medicare Part D. These results are very similar to mine: I found prescription drug 
coverage among seniors jumped from 76.5% in 2004 to 90% in 2006. This would imply 
about 15% of seniors gained coverage. 
Levy and Weir (2010) also suggest that those seniors who did not take up 
coverage were predominantly those who did not have an immediate use for it. The 
majority of those without coverage in 2006 reported they did not use prescription drugs 
and had low out-of-pocket medical expenses overall. Levy and Weir find little evidence 
of crowd-out between 2004 and 2006. Finally, Levy and Weir do not find any evidence 
of less take-up among the poor. 
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1.2.1 Demographic Factors Impacting Drug Coverage 
Whether or not an individual has can afford prescription drugs is strongly 
correlated with race, income, education, health, and other demographic factors. Klein et 
al. (2004) identify senior citizens prior to Part D who reported a delay in taking 
medication due to cost: they tended to be low income, with Medicare coverage only, have 
high out-of-pocket prescription costs, in poor health, and African-American. Similarly, 
Klein, Turvey, and Wallace (2004) find that the elderly most likely to delay prescription 
medication as a result of cost are those with Medicare coverage only, low income, poor 
health, African-American race, and age 65–80. Gellad, Haas, and Safran (2003) likewise 
report that blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to not take medication for 
cost-related reasons. Saver et al. (2004) also find that low-income Americans are more 
likely to have difficulty affording medications. 
Looking at drug coverage for the under age 65 group, the Commonwealth fund 
study Schur, Doty, and Berk (2004) find that nonelderly adults with health insurance but 
no drug coverage were at risk for high out-of-pocket costs, a form of underinsurance. 
They estimate that 9 percent of the adult population under age 65 in 2001 had health 
insurance but lacked prescription drug coverage. (Unlike my results, this paper looks at 
younger adults.) In addition, they find only 63% of seniors had insurance which included 
prescription drug coverage before Medicare Part D. The study suggested that lacking 
coverage was a stronger problem among the elderly than the nonelderly. 
Another Commonwealth fund study by Morgan and Kennedy (2010) looks at 
demographic factors related to prescription drug usage and access across seven countries. 
They find that in the United States there was little difference in prescription drug usage 
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between those with below-average income and those with average income, unlike five of 
the other countries. Because the poor are generally less healthy, this suggests less access 
to drugs among those with lower incomes. Americans with lower incomes are also more 
likely to report having skipped using drugs because of prohibitive costs. 
Looking only at those who lacked coverage before 2006, Levy and Weir (2010) 
find that seniors who enrolled in Medicare Part D were as sicker, more likely to use 
prescription drugs, and had higher out-of-pocket spending on drugs in 2004. Use of drugs 
drove take-up. However, eligibility for the Low-Income Subsidy had no effect, 
suggesting this benefit could be better-publicized. Those who gained Part D insurance 
were also more likely to be young-elderly and slightly more likely to be married (the 
latter especially for men). Interestingly, education, homeownership, income, and assets 
did not have any significance.  
After Part D, Levy and Weir (2010) concluded there was no longer a significant 
differential between the most advantaged and less-advantaged groups in education and 
income. However, because take-up of Part D was high for all racial and ethnic groups, 
although the probability of being uninsured dropped across all groups, racial and ethnic 
minorities had lower rates of coverage than non-Hispanic whites. Higher rates of 
Medicaid coverage for minorities in 2004 meant that non-Hispanic whites were in fact 
more likely to lack drug coverage before Part D, and thus experienced more gains in 
coverage from the program. 
Other studies report vulnerable groups being less likely to enroll to a greater 
extent than Levy and Weir. Maciejewski et al. (2010) find that in 2006, of Medicare 
beneficiaries without prior drug coverage, 44 percent enrolled in Part D. Enrollment was 
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correlated with younger age (65–74), female, non-Hispanic white, married or widowed, 
and self-reported health conditions. They also find that those with incomes less than 
$50,000 were less likely to enroll. They conclude that initial enrollment shortly after the 
rollout of Medicare Part D was low.  
Specifically looking at the impact of Part D on drug coverage, Neuman et al. 
(2007) find that those seniors still without drug coverage in 2006 fell into two groups: 
those in relatively good health and those potentially difficult to reach. The “difficult to 
reach” sociodemographic characteristics associated with no prescription drug coverage 
were: age 75 and older, African American, income at or below 150 percent of poverty, no 
education beyond high school, and rural residence. However, at the same time, they find 
Part D enrollment rates were higher among seniors with low incomes, racial and ethnic 
minorities, women, seniors taking prescription medications. Neuman et al. attributes this 
to the autoenrollment of those dual eligible for Medicare and Medicaid into Part D 
plans.1 Furthermore, they find that out-of-pocket spending on drugs and rates of medicate 
nonadherence full much more for those enrolled in the low-income subsidy. This 
suggests that Part D improved usage of prescribed medicine for low-income beneficiaries 
who previously relied on Medicaid drug coverage which covered less of their costs. 
Finally, Neuman et al. report that only half of those eligible were aware of the low-
income subsidy (despite being automatically enrolled in it), and even lower awareness 
rates were reported by African American and Hispanic seniors. 
                                                 
1 Those dual eligible for Medicare and Medicaid are defined as those both enrolled in Medicare Part A 
and/or Part B and enrolled in either full coverage Medicaid or one of Medicaid’s Medicare Savings 
Programs. Although all seniors on Medicaid were automatically enrolled in Part D, a minority still used 
Medicaid primarily to cover the costs of their drugs. Some of these may be seniors who were unaware of 
the low-income subsidy despite automatic enrollment. 
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Heiss et al. (2010) find healthy individuals less likely to enroll in Part D, and 
more likely to remain uninsured overall. Finally, Mahmoudi and Jensen (2014) find that 
although Part D reduced Hispanic/white disparities in annual prescription drug spending, 
it increased the African American/white disparity. If these groups may have found the 
complex enrollment process for Part D to be confusing, this suggests Medicare Part D 
could improve outreach. 
There is ample literature suggesting that Medicare beneficiaries do not always 
choose the best possible Part D plan. Plans and their benefits change every year, making 
it hard for seniors to consistently stay in the best possible plan. Abaluck and Gruber 
(2011) find participants in Part D plans valued lower plan premiums more than expected 
out-of-pocket costs and picked plans with financial characteristics such as donut hole 
coverage even when not relevant to their own situation. In the end, they calculate a loss 
of 27 percent of patient welfare from such choices. In addition, Ericson (2014) discovers 
that consumers had inertia in switching plans. This led older plans to have 10 percent 
higher premiums relative to new plans. Zhou and Zhang (2012) find only 5.2 percent of 
Medicare Part D beneficiaries are in the cheapest plan and beneficiaries often 
overprotected themselves by paying higher premiums for plan features that they did not 
need. Similarly, Hsu et al. (2008) find that beneficiaries had limited knowledge of their 
plan, and this led to greater financial burden. Finally, Heiss et al. (2013) discover that 
fewer than 25% of individuals enrolled in plans as good as the least cost plan specified by 
the Plan Finder tool made available to seniors by the Medicare administration, and that 
consumers on average spend in excess about $300 per year. The confusing nature of Part 
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D offers an explanation for why take-up might be lower among the groups who 
theoretically would be expected to have more need for prescription drugs. 
  
1.2.2 Total Health Insurance Coverage 
The determinants of health insurance coverage are similar to the determinants of 
prescription drug coverage. The CDC’s “Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: 
National Health Interview Survey, 2012” (2014) find that those with good health were 
more likely to have private insurance whereas those with poor health were more likely to 
have public or no insurance. Women and seniors were more likely to have coverage than 
men or the young. Another CDC study by Martinez and Cohen (2013) find that Hispanics 
are the least likely to have insurance, with a quarter uninsured. They also find that men 
were less likely to have insurance than woman and the age group 25-34 was the least 
likely group to have insurance. Those married, employed, and having more than a high 
school education were more likely to have insurance coverage. My own results looking at 
seniors find that health coverage hovers around 99%, near-universal.2 This is due to 
Medicare offering health insurance to everyone over age 65. 
1.3 Data 
My data set is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). This longitudinal panel 
study represents a sample of approximately 20,000 elderly and near-elderly Americans 
surveyed every two years. The original HRS cohort was born 1931-41 and first 
interviewed at the ages of 51-61. In 1998, the HRS merged with the Asset and Health 
                                                 
2 Table 1.1 contains the exact numbers for health insurance among the elderly for each year. 
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Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD), which included U.S. seniors aged 70 and 
above, from the birth year cohorts 1890–1923. At the same time, two new cohorts were 
enrolled: seniors born 1924–30 and 1942–47. With subsequent cohorts added every six 
years, the HRS fully represents the population of U.S. seniors over age 50. 
Sonnega et al. (2014) look at the composition of the Health and Retirement Study 
cohort, and find a representative rate of minority participation due to oversampling of 
African-American and Hispanic households and interviews conducted in both English 
and Spanish. Response rates are consistently between 80 and 90 percent. My final data 
set covers 1996 to 2014, and contains 35,025 observations. Individual years have 
between 4,000-8,000 observations, with the number of observations trending lower for 
earlier years. 
 
1.3.1 Variables of Interest 
Chapter 1 examines the impact of the rollout of Medicare Part D on drug coverage 
rates among seniors by demographic factors. In order to create my variable for 
prescription drug coverage, I used a series of questions asked by the HRS, linked in a 
chain, about health insurance and prescription drug coverage. In year 2006 only, several 
extra questions inquire about why an individual made the decision to enroll or not in Part 
D. For more details on how this variable was constructed, see Appendix A. My variables 
for health status, marriage, income and assets are all collected at age 64—meaning, the 
answer given when each individual was age 64.3  
                                                 
3 For those who answered the survey at an odd year of age, the data categories at age 64 were taken at age 
65 instead. 
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1.4 Summary Statistics 
1.4.1 Elderly Drug Coverage 
Table 1.1 compares my findings in the HRS on total health insurance coverage 
rates of seniors to those found using the CPS. Both results are extremely similar. Across 
all years, health insurance rates among the over 65 age group remain around 98-99% in 
both the HRS and the CPS. This is as expected, since Medicare offers insurance to all 
seniors.4 
Then I compare prescription drug coverage rates of seniors. I used two different 
outside sources. Table 1.2 uses the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey in early years, 
the HRS in middle years, and the Kaiser Foundation in later years, then compares with 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Finally, Table 1.3 has my own results from the 
HRS.5 I find similar results in all tables. Prior to the rollout of Medicare Part D, drug 
coverage rates for seniors hovered between 71-76%. However, in 2006 this jumped up to 
around 90% and remained in that range ever since. This suggest that Medicare Part D led 
to about a 15 percentage point increase in prescription drug coverage among seniors 
(Figure 1.1). 
Other sources support about a 90% rate of prescription drug coverage for seniors 
post-Part D. Levy and Weir (2010) also used the HRS to look at take-up of Medicare Part 
D, so their numbers should be most similar to mine. They find at 76% drug coverage rate 
among seniors in 2004 and a jump to 93% in 2006. The slightly higher findings of Levy 
                                                 
4 Tiny variations may be due to the fact that I use birth year in the HRS to calculate age, with a slight 
margin of error depending on the month when someone was born. Also, the CPS may include some 64-
year-olds, leading to very slightly lower numbers. 
5 I use a slightly different methodology for calculating drug coverage from 1996-2004, which is discussed 
in Appendix A. 
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and Weir in coverage is likely due to differences in methodology. Of people who use 
prescription drugs regularly, the HRS asks, “Are your drugs costs completely, mostly, or 
partly covered?” For those who did not report drug coverage from other sources, I did not 
count them as covered if they only reported mostly/partial coverage, since these people 
likely only received small discounts to the cost of drugs through prescription assistance 
programs. However, if I had counted these individuals as covered, then I would have 
found the exact same 93% as Levy and Weir. 
Also supporting the 90% estimate, Donohue (2014) find that 10% of seniors 
lacked drug coverage in 2013. Heiss et al. (2010) report Medicare Part D hit its target of 
90% coverage. In addition, according to Neuman et al. (2009) approximately 90% of all 
Medicare beneficiaries had prescription-drug coverage by June 2006. 
Next, I examine drug coverage among the near-elderly, those age 55-64. Using 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey,6 I find that in 2004, among age 45-64, 
74.1% of the population had a prescription medication expense, and 91.9% among 
the over 65 age group. In Table 1.3, I find that for the near-elderly (55-64), drug 
coverage lingered around 75%, increasing slightly over time. This intuitively 
makes sense, because before Part D the elderly would not have a significant 
advantage in obtaining drug coverage. Naturally the near-elderly had no change 
from Medicare Part D, which only applied to those over age 65. Thus, the near-
elderly had a disadvantage in obtaining drug coverage relative to the elderly after 
the roll-out of Part D in 2006. 
                                                 
6 The MEPS also contains a question asking if a private insurance plan covers prescription drugs. For 2004, 
I found that 60.21% of near-elderly (54-65) reported having prescription drug coverage by a private plan. 
For 2002, I found that 61.61% of near-elderly reported having prescription drug coverage by a private plan 
and 63.31% in 2000. The question was not asked in MEPS prior to 2000. 
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1.4.2 Landscape Prior to Medicare Part D—How the Elderly Obtained Drug Coverage 
Before and After Part D 
Before Medicare Part D, elderly Americans could obtain prescription drug 
coverage through private plans, certain types of Medicare including Medigap and HMOs, 
Medicaid, and/or long-term care insurance. I find private plans to be the largest category 
pre-2006, around 40% in 2004, with Medicare HMOs/Medicare Advantage the largest 
source of public coverage. 
After the rollout of Medicare Part D in 2006, anyone eligible for Medicare—that 
is to say, U.S. citizens who have reached age 65—could sign up for a Part D plan.7 
Joining Part D is voluntary, although Medicaid recipients with a drug plan were required 
to switch over. The enrollment period starts three months before the month in which an 
individual turns 65 and runs seven months. There is a late enrollment penalty for not 
signing up during enrollment, except for those currently with better coverage than 
Medicare Part D, who may delay enrolling until their coverage ends. Every year has an 
open enrollment period wherein seniors may change to a different Part D plan. Medicare 
Part D plans have four standard parts: the initial deductible (typically $400, but may start 
at first dollar coverage); co-insurance or medication co-payment; the coverage gap or 
donut hole (where beneficiaries pay 100% of costs unless the plan provides coverage for 
                                                 
7 Permanent residents who are not citizens can purchase Part D plans if they have worked in the U.S. for at 
least 40 quarters and are above the age of 65. Immigrants who are permanently residents for 5 years and 
have resided continuously in the U.S. for that duration also have the option to purchase Medicare coverage 
from the U.S. government, and those who purchase Part A, Part B, or both then also have the option to 
purchase Part D plans. 
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this hole); and catastrophic coverage (which triggers when more than $4,950 has been 
spent on prescription medications). 
In 2006, Medicare beneficiaries generally fell into four categories based on their 
prior coverage. Those who already had coverage better than Part D, usually private 
coverage, often kept their current plans. Medicaid-covered Medicare beneficiaries (aka 
dual eligible) were automatically enrolled in Part D.8 Medicare Advantage (MA) 
plans/Medicare HMOs were required to offer drug coverage if they didn’t already. Those 
with privately purchased prescription drug insurance, Medigap, or no coverage could 
decide if they wanted to enroll in Part D and choose a plan.  
Medicare Part D plan costs vary by income level. Seniors with higher incomes 
pay a surcharge for Part D drug coverage on top of their plan premiums. For those with 
lower incomes and assets, Medicare Part D has a means-tested subsidy to help cover 
premiums, deductibles and copayments. Low-income subsidy recipients are automatically 
enrolled in Medicare Part D, defaulted randomly into a set of plans below a price 
benchmark. They are also automatically switched if their plan moves to above the 
benchmark the next year. According to Ericson (2014), such automatically enrolled 
recipients are half the market and face substantial inertia. This automatic enrollment 
implies that drug coverage should be higher among those with lower income and assets 
after Part D. 
Looking at type of drug coverage by demographic factors post part-D, of the age 
65 and older group, 24% were covered by Part D, 20% through a Medicare HMO or MA 
                                                 
8 Those in my sample who reported having Medicaid drug coverage would be those who answered in the 
survey that their drugs were covered by Medicaid. Although all seniors in Medicaid were automatically 
enrolled in Part D, they still had the option of continuing to use Medicaid to cover the costs of their 
prescription drugs. Figure 1.2 reports the primary method used to pay for drugs. 
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plan, and 34% through a private plan (Figure 1.2). Coverage steadily increased with 
assets and income. In addition, for seniors, coverage by health was lowest for those who 
reported excellent health, peaked at good health, and decreased with poor health. This is 
likely due to the correlation between poor health and poverty.  
Looking at the contrast between public and private coverage before and after Part 
D, I find private drug insurance fell by about 4 percentage points in 2006. By 2014, 
seniors with private drug coverage had fallen by 12 percentage points relative to 2004. 9 
The change seems to be driven by people who enrolled in Medicare Part D or a Medicare 
Advantage/HMO plan with drug coverage. Since the reason for switching coverage was 
not asked in the HRS, it is difficult to determine how much of the decline in employer-
sponsored drug insurance can be attributed to crowd-out as opposed to general trends of 
falling employer-provided insurance over time. According to Strumpf (2010), half of all 
large employers in the U.S. who previously offered retiree health insurance dropped this 
coverage over the past two decades. Hence Medicare Part D could have been an 
important source of coverage for those who lost their employer-sponsored drug 
insurance. 
Also using the HRS, Levy and Weir (2010) argue there was not very much 
crowd-out between 2004 and 2006, pointing out that private coverage also declined 
between 2002-2004, which I also find. However, Engelhardt and Gruber (2010) find an 
80% decline private prescription drug insurance after Part D, and Lichtenberg and Sun 
(2007) find 72% crowd-out in number of prescriptions paid for by the government. 
                                                 
9 This is defined as the percentage point decrease in seniors covered by employer-sponsored, Medigap, or 
military drug coverage. Although military coverage is a form of public coverage, it was lumped in with 
privately-purchased Medigap plans in some survey years. As a result, this is a somewhat imprecise estimate 
of the decline in private drug insurance over time. 
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Overall, Part D represented a significant shift from private coverage of drug 
expenditures to public coverage, as well as an increase in total coverage overall. 
 
1.4.3 Coverage by Income and Assets 
Next, I look at the impact of Part D on drug coverage by income and assets 
categories. Mean income across the entire sample, all years, was $54,566. Median 
income was $35,360. Minimum income was zero and maximum was $5,084,600. My 
sample in the HRS ages over time, which leads to significant changes in average sample 
income over time. For a better basis of comparison, I compare income and assets at age 
64 for each respondent.10 I create my income categories by dividing my sample into four 
income groups.11 My categories are as follows: “$0,000-$12,000”; “$12,000-$30,000”; 
“$30,000-$100,000”; and “Greater than 100,000.” Table 1.4 shows the distributions of 
my sample across these categories. 
To measure assets, again I examine age 64 for each observation. I create bins for 
assets using census data on quintiles of the over age 65 group.12 The categories I chose 
are based off census data on median net worth of households by net worth quintile and 
age of householder. My categories are “< $7,263”; “$7,263-68,839”; “$68,839-205,985”; 
“205,985-630,754”; and “> $630,754.” The distribution is shown in Table 1.5. For my 
sample, the mean assets at 64 was $355,487 and the median was $139,000.  
                                                 
10 Since the HRS surveys every 2 years, in for those with birth years in odd years this is age 65. 
11 To calculate income, I used the sum of all income in a household (only including respondent and 
spouse), reported in nominal dollars. The HRS imputed missing components of income. 
12 I used total household assets, also reported in nominal dollars. This is calculated as the sum of all wealth 
components (excluding second home) minus debt. As with income, the HRS imputes missing assets. 
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In addition, I look at how drug coverage changed by income and assets before and 
after Medicare Part D. In 2004, those in the poorest category of household income 
actually had a slightly higher rate of prescription drug coverage (by about 4%). In 2006, 
drug coverage rose across the board for all income categories, but increased the most for 
those with incomes over $100,000 and assets over $200,000. The poorest income 
category now had a lower drug insurance coverage rate than the richest group. Levy and 
Weir (2010) also found that education, homeownership status, and income and assets had 
no significant effect on take-up or on the probability of not having drug coverage, and 
that the Low Income Subsidy had low take-up. They found that prior to 2004, Medicaid 
actually made disadvantaged groups more likely to have drug coverage. A similar pattern 
is evident with assets, where gains in coverage were greater for the upper quintiles than 
the lowest quintile. Although Part D improved coverage for all income and asset groups, 
the gains seem to be greater for those who were already wealthier, indicating a potential 
for improvement if the program’s goal was to extend coverage to those who were least 
able to afford it on their own.  
The different increases in coverage suggests different price sensitivity to the price 
change for drug insurance. Using the near-elderly as a control group, Ketcham and Simon 
(2008) find that from 2005-2007, Part D reduced the daily cost medication for seniors by 
21.7%. They also calculate that use of prescription drugs rose by 4.7%, hence suggesting 
a price elasticity of demand of -0.22. Based on an increase in the number of elderly filling 
any prescription, they suggest that the increase in utilization came from both those who 
previously had no coverage and those who switched to Part D. This indicates that Part D 
lowered drug costs for many seniors, supported by Yin et al. (2008) and Lichtenberg and 
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Sun (2007) both finding out-of-pocket drug costs for seniors fell after Part D, by 13.1 and 
18.4 percent respectively. Finally, Duggan and Morton (2010) find that for drugs with 
significant competition, the creation of Part D lowered their prices, as well as decreasing 
total drug costs for enrollees previously uninsured. Furthermore, they also find that 
insured seniors are more price elastic, a counter-intuitive result. The cause may be that 
Medicare Advantage drug plans often include formulary (a list of prescription drugs that 
are covered by a specific health care plan) and other mechanisms to ensure enrollees have 
to pay more for more expensive drugs. My own findings contribute to this literature by 
suggesting that the price elasticity of seniors may also vary across demographics and 
income level. The goal of my next section is to examine how drug coverage changed 
based on demographic factors, particularly race. 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Theoretical Predictions 
The previous section shows how the landscape for prescription drug coverage for 
seniors changed after the roll-out of Medicare Part D. This section focuses on the impact 
of demographic factors, asking if Medicare Part D expanded drug coverage to minorities, 
the less-educated, and those with lower incomes—groups with less ability to afford 
coverage without government intervention. The 15% increase in coverage demonstrated 
in the last section would be expected to disproportionately benefit disadvantaged groups 
who could not afford coverage prior to turning age 65. If so, this would provide evidence 
that Medicare Part D helped make prescription drug coverage available across all seniors. 
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However, looking at the literature on take-up of Medicare Part D, it is unclear if 
Medicare Part D successfully reached the groups who previously had lower drug 
coverage. This poses a different question about the efficiency of Part D. However, drug 
coverage did increase for all groups post-2006. Levy and Weir (2010) argued that the 
complexity of the menu of options of Part D plans could potentially discourage 
enrollment, citing how take-up of social benefits is especially low for the elderly. 
1.5.2 Part D’s Take-up by Demographic Factors 
First, I divided seniors into three groups based on birth year: 1928-1932, 1933-
1937, and 1938-1941. I found that the younger cohorts had higher coverage before Part D 
than the oldest one, by about 3-5%. However, rates of coverage became similar (around 
93%) after Part D’s rollout. If older seniors needed coverage more, then Part D may have 
been of greater aid to them. 
Next, I examined drug coverage by various demographic factors for the elderly 
(those over age 65) pre and post 2006. The goal was to see to how the impact of 
Medicare Part D differed across seniors belonging to different demographic groups. This 
is important as one of the stated purposes of the program was to smooth out differences in 
coverage across seniors (Poisal and Murray 2001, Safran et al. 2002, Stolberg 2006). 
Table 1.6 shows a huge change before and after Medicare Part D, raising mean 
drug coverage rate in every single category. Prior to Part D, minorities had a higher rate 
of coverage than the white non-Hispanic population, which can be attributed to greater 
coverage by Medicaid (Levy and Weir 2010). Those in worse health had a higher take-up 
rate, except for the absolutely worst category. Marriage and education increased take-up. 
Although groups which previously had lower drug coverage rates had higher take-up, 
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after Part D there was little difference across all groups of seniors in rates of prescription 
drug insurance coverage. 
Everyone benefitted from Part D. However, those Hispanic, black, poorer, and 
less educated all had lower take-up rates. These groups already had higher coverage 
before 2006, so afterwards prescription drug insurance looked very similar across race. 
The difference between the black and white population disappeared, whereas the 
Hispanic population had slightly lower coverage rates after Part D. However, even 
though the gap between the Hispanic and the white population was one of the largest 
after Part D, the difference was less than 3 percentage points. Overall, Part D decreased 
the differences in drug coverage rates across demographics. 
As mentioned in my literature review, Levy and Weir (2010), Maciejewski et al. 
(2010), Neuman et al. (2007), and Mahmoudi and Jensen (2014) all find Part D had 
difficulty reaching certain disadvantaged groups. Although drug coverage increased for 
all groups post-2006, disparities by race and income did not disappear; in some cases, 
they even find increased disparities. 
My own results agree with Levy and Weir (2010) that take-up was higher among 
the white population. Although all groups benefited from Part D, it is not clear from 
Table 1.6 that disadvantaged groups benefitted more. The one exception to this is men 
versus women: men, who previously had a slightly higher coverage rate, had a much 
lower coverage rate than women after Part D (although again, mean coverage rates 
increased for both groups.) These results suggest that Part D may not have reached 
certain disadvantaged groups. However, they still show huge across-the-board increases 
in drug coverage. 
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Table 1.7 looks at types of drug coverage for various respondents by demographic 
factors prior to Medicare Part D. The sample is limited to those who were at least 65 in 
2004. I find the largest gap in descriptive characteristics to be between those who have 
coverage through employers and those who have Medicaid. Those with Medicaid are the 
least well-educated, have the lowest income and assets, are more likely to be black or 
Hispanic, are less likely to have a high school degree and have a near-zero chance of 
having a college degree. They are more likely to be female but less likely to be married. 
Those with Medicaid coverage had the lowest income and assets and those with employer 
coverage had the highest. Given that Medicaid is means-targeted, this is as expected. 
Table 1.8 limits the sample to respondents without prescription drug coverage in 
2004 and examines their demographic characteristics as a function of what drug coverage 
they obtained in 2006. I focused my analysis on those who obtained Part D or remained 
without coverage, because these had the largest sample size and also provided the results 
most relevant to my research. I found that demographic characteristics had little impact 
on drug coverage rates after Part D. Women were more likely to sign up. However, 
education, income and assets did not have any impact. According to Levy and Weir 
(2010), the predominant determinants for signing up for Part D were poor health, using 
prescription drugs, and higher out-of-pocket spending in 2004 relative to those who 
remained without coverage. 
Next, I use these demographics factors to predict prescription drug coverage in a 
random effects model. My equation is: 
Drug Coverageim = β0 + β1Age + β2-4 Self-Reported Health + β5-8 Income + β9-12 Assets + 
β13 Marriage + β14 Gender + β16-17 Education + β18-21 Race + β22 Retired + ε         (1.1) 
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Table 1.9 shows the effect of various demographic factors on probability of 
having prescription drug coverage, using random effects. I examine the elderly before 
and after Part D to see if the demographic factors predicting prescription drug coverage 
changed. 
My time-varying variables are prescription drug coverage (dummy),13 age, 
dummies for self-reported health, income and assets category dummies, dummy for 
married, and dummy for retired. My time-invariant variables are dummies for race,14 
gender, and education.15 
My most important finding is that before Part D, being a racial minority was 
correlated with being more likely to have drug coverage, but after Part D, the white 
population was more likely to have coverage. The coefficient for the black population 
went from being 0.04 before Part D to being less likely to have coverage with a 
coefficient of -0.01. The effect was even stronger for the Hispanic non-white population, 
who went from a coefficient of 0.12, indicating being more likely to have drug coverage, 
to -0.01. However, after Part D the impact became insignificant for both groups. 
In other words, Medicare Part D take-up appears to be lower among 
disadvantaged groups. This is not to say that it decreased coverage for minorities, only 
that the program increased coverage more for whites, who previously had lower coverage 
rates. Similarly, I also found that having lower assets was previously correlated with 
higher rates of coverage (likely because impoverished seniors were more likely to be in 
                                                 
13 A dummy for health insurance was dropped due to nearly all of my sample having health insurance. 
14 Race has five categories: White Non-Hispanic, Black Non-Hispanic, Other Non-Hispanic, Hispanic 
Non-White, and Hispanic White. 
15 Nine categories for education were used in my regression. In Table 1.8, I include only a dummy for 
College Degree (4 years or more) and High School Graduate (not including those with additional 
education.) 
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worse health and thus need to use prescription drugs), but after Part D the correlation 
flipped and higher assets were correlated with being more likely to have coverage. The 
effect of income remained the same, but assets may be a better measure of the wealth of 
seniors since many over the age of 65 would be retired. 
Education was also positively and significantly correlated with coverage both 
before and after. Similar to my means, I found that women disproportionately benefited 
from Part D, switching from being less likely to have coverage to being more likely. 
Marriage also became positively correlated with coverage for those eligible for Part D. 
Age had nearly no impact and the effect of self-reported health status was also largely 
insignificant. Being retired had a negative impact on prescription drug coverage rates, 
suggesting some seniors lost employer-provided drug insurance after retirement. These 
results are all in line with what I expected based on my description statistics. 
1.6 Conclusions 
My results suggest that Medicare Part D increased access to prescription drug care 
across all demographic categories, but not to the extent expected. Minorities were 
actually more likely than whites to have coverage before Medicare Part D. This flipped 
after the rollout of Medicare Part D. Although coverage increased for all groups across all 
demographic factors, it increased more for those who were white non-Hispanic, as well 
was those with higher income and assets, those with more education, those who were 
married, and women. This ties in with literature suggesting that take up of the Part D 
Low-Income subsidy was low. My findings suggest a need to improve the targeting of 
Medicare Part D, particularly outreach towards lower income groups. This is important 
23 
 
because improving affordability of drugs among the less wealthy was a policy goal of 
Part D when it was first created a decade ago. 
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Table 1.1: Percent of Seniors with Health Insurance Coverage using Various Sources 
 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
CPS N/A 98.9 99.3 98.1 98.6 98.7 
HRS (author’s 
calculations) 
98.5 99.2 99.4 99.4 99.1 99.0 
HRS Sample 
Size 
338 2,335 3,413 4,536 5,613 6,666 
 2008 2010 2012 
CPS 98.1 98 98.5 
HRS (author’s 
calculations) 
99.2 99.1 99.0 
HRS Sample 
Size 
7,677 7,094 6,589 
Source: Current Population Reports, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in 
the United States: 2012-1998. 
HRS 1996-2012; Total observations: 35,025 (This includes numerous observations 
generated by the merges, particularly with the very large tracker file, which is why it is 
larger than any individual set of observations per year.) 
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Table 1.2: Percent of Seniors with Drug Coverage Using Outside Data 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
MCBS 
and others 
73 76 N/A 74.2 76.2 92.9 90 90 90 
MEPS N/A N/A N/A N/A 71.4 90 90 90 N/A 
Source for row 1: 1996-1998 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey  
2004-2006 HRS, Levy and Weir (2010) 
2008-2012 Kaiser Foundation 
Source for row 2: MEPS, Engelhardt and Jonathan Gruber (2011) 
 
Table 1.3: Percent of Sample with Drug Coverage 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Percent 
of 
Seniors 
75.7 74.6 76.5 74.2 76.5 89.9 91.7 90.0 89.5 87.9 
Sample 
Size 
333 2,315 3,404 4,514 5,348 6,666 7,677 7,094 6,589 5,822 
Percent 
of 
Near-
Elderly 
69.59 72.70 76.14 78.32 78.91 78.87 78.88 77.71 77.76 77.26 
Sample 
Size 
7,771 6,250 4,539 3,035   1,517 6,891 3,565 4,504 4,647 5,259 
Source: My own calculations in the HRS 
Total observations: 35,025 
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Table 1.4: Elderly Drug Coverage by Household Income 
Household 
Income at Age 
64-65 
Percent of 
Sample 
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
$0-$12,000 14.88% 71.43% 71.84% 77.92% 78.61% 84.44% 
$12,000-$30,000 27.33% 73.38% 76.56% 72.99% 75.08% 87.75% 
$30,000-$100,000 46.02% 77.03% 83.08% 76.45% 77.70% 91.87% 
>$100,000 11.77% 78.57% 82.11% 74.63% 72.07% 93.15% 
Total 100% 70.94% 71.96% 72.94% 74.70% 89.14% 
 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 
$0-$12,000 90.56% 88.96% 88.35% 86.70% 
$12,000-$30,000 92.36% 91.20% 90.43% 91.01% 
$30,000-$100,000 94.15% 92.97% 92.68% 93.45% 
>$100,000 96.14% 96.02% 94.78% 95.38% 
Total 92.99% 91.67% 91.48% 92.02% 
Note: “Total” coverage will not be the exact same as Figure 1.1 because not every 
individual had data for income and also because I altered my sample size prior to my 
main regressions. Elderly is defined as anyone over age 65. 
 
 
Table 1.5: Elderly Drug Coverage by Household Assets 
Household Assets At 
Age 64-65 
Percent 
of 
Sample 
2004 2006 
< $7,263 8.86 80.05% 85.55% 
$7,263-68,839 14.01 76.56% 90.06% 
$68,839-205,985 19.25 78.71% 87.72% 
205,985-630,754 18.31 76.09% 90.88% 
> $630,754 39.56 72.54% 89.09% 
All 100 74.70% 89.14% 
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Table 1.6: Mean Drug Coverage for Elderly Before and After Part D   
Mean Percent of Sample 
With Prescription Drug 
Coverage 
Age 65 and 
Older Pre- 
Part D 
(1996-2004) 
Age 65 and 
Older, Post 
Part D 
(2006-2012) 
Change Percent 
Change 
TOTAL SAMPLE MEAN 77% 89% 12% 16% 
Dummy for Worst (Self-
Reported) Health 75% 86% 12% 15% 
Dummy for Second Worst 
Health 77% 90% 13% 18% 
Dummy for Medium 
Health 78% 89% 11% 14% 
Dummy for Second Best 
Health 78% 89% 11% 14% 
Dummy for Best Health 77% 89% 12% 15% 
Dummy for Married 77% 91% 14% 18% 
Men 79% 88% 9% 11% 
Women 76% 90% 14% 19% 
White Non-Hispanic 76% 90% 14% 19% 
Black Non-Hispanic 81% 91% 10% 12% 
Other Non-Hispanic 87% 86% -1% -1% 
Hispanic Non-White 86% 87% 1% 1% 
Hispanic White 78% 87% 9% 11% 
Black Men 82% 91% 9% 10% 
Interaction for White and 
College 81% 93% 12% 15% 
Dummy for High School 
Degree 76% 89% 13% 17% 
Dummy for College 
Degree (at least 4 years) 82% 93% 11% 13% 
Dummy for Retired 87% 84% -3% -3% 
Sample Size* 5,062 6,073   
*Sample size varies based on data availability, so this gives maximum sample. 
Note: “College” includes those with a four year college degree or greater education. 
“High School” includes those who graduated high school, but did not get a four year 
college degree. 
 
 
  
28 
 
Table 1.7: Respondent Characteristics in 2004 by Type of Prescription Drug Coverage in 
2004 
 Employer Medicaid Medicare 
Advantage 
Medigap Other None 
Female 0.553 0.746 0.569 0.565 0.530 0.605 
Married 0.636 0.237 0.572 0.617 0.512 0.562 
White 
Non-
Hispanic 
0.854 0.395 0.722 0.896 0.702 0.837 
Black 
Non-
Hispanic 
0.097 0.282 0.125 0.070 0.199 0.096 
Hispanic 
(any race) 0.035 0.282 0.133 0.018 0.072 0.059 
Education= 
High 
School 
0.369 0.191 0.344 0.362 0.333 0.374 
Education= 
College or 
Higher 
0.234 0.023 0.168 0.233 0.141 0.142 
Median 
Income 
(2004) if 
nonzero 
18,000 6,520 10,000 10,450 9,000 10,000 
Median 
Assets 
(2004) 
242,000 800 177,000 269,500 99,425 186,000 
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Table 1.8: How much selection into Part D was there? Respondent with no coverage in 
2004 by prescription drug insurance coverage in 2006 
 
 Part D None 
Female 63.19% 60.90% 
Married 58.26% 59.52% 
White 
Non-
Hispanic 
84.83% 90.74% 
Black 
Non-
Hispanic 
9.66% 6.57% 
Hispanic 
(any race) 
4.54% 2.16% 
Education= 
High 
School 
40.29% 39.27% 
Education= 
College or 
Higher 
14.30% 15.92% 
Median 
Income 
(2004) if 
nonzero 
9,857.5 10,000 
Median 
Assets 
(2004) 
174,500 210,500 
Sample 
Size 
1,035 1,156 
Sample = respondents with no prescription drug coverage in 2004 
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Table 1.9: Two Random Effects Regressions of Demographic Factors Against 
Prescription Drug Coverage, Before and After Part D. 
Prescription 
Drug Coverage 
(Dummy) 
Elderly 
Pre-Part D (1996-
2004) 
Elderly 
Post-Part D (2006-
2012) 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
Age -0.01*** 0.00 
Dummy for Worst 
(Self-Reported) 
Health -0.02 -0.04*** 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health 0.01 -0.01* 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 0.00 0.00 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health 0.02 0.01 
Income Under 
$12000 (Dummy) -0.06*** -0.04*** 
Income $12000-
$30000 (Dummy) -0.05*** -0.03** 
Income $30000-
$100000 
(Dummy) 0.01 -0.01 
Assets Dummy 
for First 
Category 0.07*** -0.03*** 
Assets Dummy 
for Second 
Category 0.03* -0.03*** 
Assets Dummy 
for Third 
Category 0.04*** -0.02** 
Assets Dummy 
for Fourth 
Category 0.04*** -0.02** 
Dummy for 
Marriage -0.01 0.02*** 
Dummy for 
Gender (Woman) -0.04*** 0.02*** 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.05*** 0.03*** 
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Table 1.9 (continued) 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 0.10*** 0.05*** 
Dummy for White 
Non-Hispanic -0.01 0.02** 
Dummy for Black 
Non-Hispanic 0.04* -0.01 
Dummy for Other 
Non-Hispanic 0.04 -0.01 
Dummy for 
Hispanic Not 
White 0.12*** -0.01 
Dummy for 
Retired 0.04*** -0.05*** 
Number of 
Observations 
13513 23472 
Number of 
Groups 
5853 6710 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Figure 1.1: Percent of Seniors (Over Age 65) With Drug Coverage 
 
Source: HRS, 1996-2014 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Categories of Drug Coverage 
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CHAPTER 2. DOES MEDICARE PART D EXTEND LIVES—MEDICARE PART D AND 
MORTALITY 
2.1 Introduction 
A decade after the creation of Medicare Part D, now is the perfect time to revisit 
its impact on the health of seniors. Chapter 2 examines the effects of Medicare Part D’s 
prescription drug coverage on life expectancy. 
Medicare Part D was introduced in January 2006, with the policy goal of reducing 
the burden of drug expenditures on the elderly population. Safran et al. (2002) reports 
that prior to Medicare Part D, 23% of seniors reported spending more than $100 per 
month on prescription drugs, and among seniors without drug coverage, 43% spent more 
than $100 monthly. Rising drug costs for seniors due to medical advancement drove the 
creation of Part D. According to Duggan (2005), prescription drug expenditures grew 
twice as rapidly as all other health care spending in the 1990s. By 2003, the average 
senior paid about $1,789 on drugs per year, with more than half of drug spending out-of-
pocket and only 7.8% covered by Medicare (Duggan and Morton 2010). In Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003, policymakers created Medicare Part D partly with the intent 
to reduce disparities between beneficiaries of different income levels (Poisal and Murray 
2001). The law included a subsidy for large employers to discourage them from 
eliminating private prescription coverage for their retired workers and prohibited the 
government from negotiating discounts with drug companies or establishing a 
formulary16 (a key goal of pharmaceutical lobbyists.)17 
                                                 
16 However, Medicare Advantage/HMO plans may establish a formulary. 
17 The act also included several non-drug-related provisions, including mandating a six-city trial of a partly 
privatized Medicare system (by 2010), giving an extra $25 billion to rural hospitals, and adding a pretax 
health savings account for working people. 
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Seniors can purchase a Part D drug plan, purchase a private Medicare Advantage 
or HMO plan which includes drug coverage, or retain their existing coverage. As of 
2018, 43 million individuals in the U.S. are covered by Part D.18 The cost is projected by 
the Congressional Budget Office to reach $99 billion or 15% of Medicare spending in 
2019, increasing with the aging of the population. For those who enrolled in stand-alone 
Part D plans, there is a base monthly premium of $35.02,19 a maximum annual deductible 
of $415, and a copay of a flat fee or 25% of generic drug costs and 37% of brand-name 
drug costs up to $5,100. The national average monthly bid for a Part D plan in 2018 was 
$57.93 and the average deductible was $243.55 for stand-alone Part D plans and $160.49 
for Medicare Advantage plans. About three-quarters of financing for Part D comes from 
general revenues, with around three-twentieths from beneficiary premiums and a tenth 
from state contributions. Individuals below 150% of the federal poverty line and with 
modest assets are eligible for the Low-Income Subsidy, which pays for all of their 
premiums and deductible, but not their copays. Seniors between 135-150% of the federal 
poverty line receive Extra Help subsidies, which pay a percentage of their premium and 
deductible. Nearly half of all black beneficiaries and a third of Hispanic beneficiaries 
receive the Low-Income Subsidy, compared to about 17% of white beneficiaries. Those 
with income above $85,00020 pay an income-related monthly adjustment amount in 
addition to their plan premiums. This amount starts at $12.40 a month and increases 
based on income to a maximum of $77.40 a month for those individuals with income of 
$500,000 above or married couples with income of $750,000 or above (SSA 2019). 
                                                 
18 This includes employer-only group plans. “The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit: Fact Sheet” 
(2017) and “An Overview of the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit” (2018). 
19 Or $33.19 as of 2019. 
20 As of 2019, this is based on yearly income reported to the IRS in 2017, two years previously. 
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Part D was the largest expansion of Medicare in the program’s history. Analyzing 
the effectiveness of such a large program is important.21 Furthermore, it is worth 
considering whether a program that offered drug plans to all seniors managed to reach the 
portion of the population with the greatest need—those with low incomes, those without 
prior coverage, and those with a need for prescription drugs. However, there is an 
enormous selection bias issue in comparing those who took up Part D in 2006 to those 
who didn’t, because seniors in good health were less likely to take up drug insurance after 
the expansion. Also, since Part D is a relatively recent program, it is difficult to capture 
its impact on total lifespans. 
Medicare Part D had an instant effect on drug coverage. Rates of prescription 
drug coverage for seniors before Part D were already relatively high, around 75%.22 
However, in 2006, the rollout if Medicare Part D increased coverage to 90%. According 
to Levy and Weir (2010), those in good health (who presumably had less need for 
coverage) dominated those who did not take-up. From a policy standpoint, this indicates 
there might not be much gain to trying to push coverage all the way up to 100%, if most 
of those currently without do not use drugs. Instead of increasing enrollment, media 
activism tends to focus more costs for seniors from coverage gaps in Part D and concerns 
that those who do not enroll may face a late penalty if they need coverage later 
(Singletary 2003, Andrews 2019). 
A 15% increase in drug coverage among seniors would be expected to affect 
health outcomes, even life expectancy. In the diverse literature surrounding Medicare 
                                                 
21 Later, I will look at the impact of Part D on black men in particular. Based on the percent of the elderly 
population which is both black and male, I roughly estimate their share of Medicare Part D in 2018 to be 
3.3% of spending, or 3.3 billion dollars. 
22 See Figure 1.1. 
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Part D, my contribution is to focus on the relationship between life expectancy and Part D 
coverage by race. This an important policy area given the ongoing issue of discrepancies 
in access to healthcare and health outcomes between black and white Americans. 
There may be reasons to expect a differential impact for particular demographic 
groups. For example, Finkelstein and McKnight (2007) study the impact of Medicare in 
1965 on mortality. They find no change in overall elderly mortality. However, they do 
find the introduction of Medicare to be associated with a decline in non-white elderly 
pneumonia-related mortality rates. Currie and Gruber (1996) also find black children 
exhibited a much larger decline in mortality than white children due to Medicaid. Thus, 
even when overall mortality is not affected, certain groups with relatively less access to 
care may see improvement. 
If Medicare Part D removed the differential in prescription drug coverage by race 
and gender, then we could see a shift in life expectancy among these groups. My findings 
in Chapter 1 suggest that after Medicare Part D, all elderly demographic groups had 
similar drug coverage rates. The program itself was designed to offer universal coverage 
to everyone, and part of the rationale was seniors experiencing increasing difficulty 
affording drugs. My contribution is to examine Medicare Part D based on a new outcome, 
life expectancy, focusing on the differential impact between black and white Americans. 
Unlike previous studies, which focused on changes in mortality at age 66, I examine 
more advanced ages. In addition, I estimate the value of lives saved compared to the costs 
of the program. My results are suggestive that Medicare Part D had no impact on 
mortality for the white population, but increased the probability of living to age 73 
(conditional on living to age 65) by 9 percentage points for black men. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
 Other studies looking at the impact of Medicare Part D on coverage rates find 
similar results to my 15 percentage point increase in coverage (Figure 1.1). Levy and 
Weir (2010) also use the Health and Retirement Study to look at take-up rates of 
prescription drug coverage among the elderly. Among those without drug coverage in 
2004, 50%–60% took up Part D coverage in 2006. The rollout of Part D had a large effect 
on drug coverage of senior citizens: 24% were without prescription drug coverage in 
2004, and this shrank to 7% in 2006.23 
Levy and Weir find the most important factor in the decision of seniors to enroll 
in Part D is use of prescription drugs—the majority of those who remained without 
coverage reported they did not use prescription drugs and had low out-of-pocket medical 
expenses. Surprisingly, Levy and Weir find no difference in take-up with respect to 
economic status. Generally, they find individuals kept existing drug coverage and take-up 
of Part D was driven by those without coverage. However, many beneficiaries were 
unaware of the SSA “Extra Help” subsidy and its eligibility requirements. In contrast, 
Engelhardt and Gruber (2010) find that Part D resulted in 80% crowd-out of both 
prescription drug insurance coverage and prescription drug expenditures of those 65 and 
older. 
 Donohue (2014), Heiss et al. (2010), and Neuman et al. (2009) all also find 
prescription drug coverage rates among seniors of about 90% after Part D. By January 30, 
                                                 
23 This result is very similar to mine, although I found 90% coverage of seniors in 2006 relative to their 
93%. This difference can be explained by how we counted those individuals who reported having partial 
drug coverage, a number of respondents too small to affect my regression results. 
38 
 
2007, about 24 million individuals were receiving prescription drug coverage through 
Medicare Part D (PDPs and MA-PDs combined), according to CMS. 
 
2.2.1 Importance of Prescription Drugs to Health of Elderly 
Mortality is the most extreme health outcome. Part D has been found to improve 
overall health according to studies cited later in this section, which found decreases in 
medication nonadherence, hospitalizations, and emergency room care. We might 
reasonably expect such a large increase in drug coverage could impact life expectancy, 
the most important health outcome of all. 
Dunn and Shapiro (2017) look at a similar research question: if Medicare Part D 
impacted cardiovascular-related mortality. They argue that with nearly half of drug 
expenditures spent on treatments to prevent cardiovascular-related deaths, and heart 
disease the leading cause of death in the United States, there is a strong reason to believe 
that a program which expands drug coverage could impact mortality in immediate ways. 
Using variation in drug coverage across counties before the rollout, they find mortality 
dropped significantly in those counties most affected by Part D, to the extent that 7,000 to 
26,000 more individuals were alive in mid-2007 because of the Part D implementation in 
2006. This raises an interesting question which my research addresses: whether the same 
effect exists in microdata. By using the Health and Retirement Survey, I obtain detailed 
information on the demographics, income/assets, and health status of survey respondents. 
Comparatively, my paper looks at all causes of death and includes the entire United 
States instead of a select 169 counties. 
In addition, Huh and Reif (2017) also conclude Medicare Part D reduced elderly 
mortality. Using confidential mortality data from the National Vital Statistics System of 
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the National Center for Health Statistics for the years 2001-2008, they find a reduction of 
mortality at age 66 by 2.2% annually, primarily driven by cardiovascular mortality. They 
used a differences-in-differences to compare mortality rates among the near-elderly and 
young-elderly. However, my research looks at mortality in later years (age 73) and uses 
more detailed demographics data. 
A few other papers have looked at Medicare spending and life expectancy, though 
none have specifically looked at Medicare Part D. Lubitz et al. (2003) find that elderly 
with longer life expectancy had similar cumulative health care expenditures until death 
compared to those in poorer health, thus indicating that increased longevity does not 
necessarily lead to greater health expenditures. Similarly, Lubitz et al. (1995) find that 
lifetime Medicare payments were not substantially affected by longevity. Looking at the 
big picture, Chetty et al. (2016) shows increases in life expectancy in the U.S. of up to 
two years over the last ten years, highly correlated with health behaviors. 
 Previous findings suggest Medicare Part D had a positive effect on other health 
outcomes besides mortality. Afendulis et al. (2011) find after the introduction of Part D 
benefits, seniors’ hospitalization rates fell. Also, Hsu et al. (2006) find that a cap on drug 
benefits led to unfavorable clinical outcomes and an increase in emergency department 
care. Stuart et al. (2013) analyze medication adherence among seniors with myocardial 
infarction and find improvements in adherence post Part D. Jung et al. (2014) and 
Donohue et al. (2010) find similar results for heart disease medication compliance. Dall 
et al. (2013) find that Part D led to a decline in congestive heart failure among seniors. 
Finally, Zhang et al. (2010) finds that after Part D, medication adherence increased for 
seniors across the board, with the greatest improvement for those who previously lacked 
40 
 
drug coverage. In general, it appears Part D helped improve the health of seniors, 
suggesting it may have had an impact on life expectancy. 
 
2.2.2 Demographic Factors Impacting Drug Coverage 
Health insurance coverage is strongly correlated with demographics such as race 
and gender, and prescription drug coverage is no exception. Looking at seniors without 
drug coverage before Part D, Levy and Weir (2010) find the uninsured are more likely to 
be in fair or poor health, slightly older, report more chronic health conditions, be less 
well-educated, and have lower income and assets. Looking at the characteristics of 
respondents without any drug coverage in 2004, as a function of what drug coverage they 
have in 2006, those who signed up for Part D were relatively younger and slightly more 
likely to be married than those who remained without coverage. The biggest factors 
determining who signed up were the group which was sicker, more likely to use 
prescription drugs, and had higher out-of-pocket spending on drugs in 2004. Thus, 
adverse selection proved to be a powerful factor driving take-up. Other characteristics 
such as cognitive ability, education, homeownership, income, assets, and eligibility for 
the Low-Income Subsidy did not have significance. However, unmarried men were less 
likely to sign up for Part D. 
With respect to education and income, Levy and Weir find that prior to Part D, 
lower income and educated individuals had lower rates of coverage, whereas individuals 
in the highest education or income category were significantly less likely to lack 
coverage. After Part D, coverage increased for all groups, with gains for the lower 
income and education groups. Levy and Weir concluded Part D erased any difference in 
coverage rates between the most advantaged and least advantaged groups.  
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However, higher rates of Medicaid coverage for minorities in 2004 meant that 
non-Hispanic whites were in fact more likely to lack drug coverage before Part D. In 
addition, take-up of Part D was high for all racial and ethnic groups. Thus, although the 
probability of being uninsured dropped across all groups after Part D, racial and ethnic 
minorities have slightly lower rates of coverage than non-Hispanic whites. 
Other studies also report minorities and the poor being less likely to enroll. 
Maciejewski et al. (2010) find that in 2006, of Medicare beneficiaries without prior drug 
coverage, 44 percent enrolled in Part D. Enrollment was correlated with younger age 
(65–74), female, non-Hispanic white, married or widowed, and self-reported health 
conditions. They also find that those with incomes less than $50,000 were less likely to 
enroll. They conclude that initial enrollment after the rollout of Medicare Part D was low.  
 Certain groups have always been more vulnerable to lacking drug coverage. Klein 
et al. (2004) and Klein, Turvey, and Wallace (2004) find that seniors who report cost-
related medication nonadherence tended to be low income, with Medicare coverage only, 
high out-of-pocket prescription costs, in poor health, of older ages, and African 
American. Gellad, Haas, and Safran (2003) likewise report that minorities were more 
likely to not take prescribed medication because they could not afford it. 
After Part D, Neuman et al. (2007) find seniors without drug coverage tended to 
be either in relatively good health or possess characteristics which would make them 
harder to reach: age 75 and older, African American, income at or below 150 percent of 
poverty, no education beyond high school, and rural residence. However, due to 
autoenrollment of dual eligibles24 into Part D plans they also find Part D enrollment rates 
                                                 
24 Those dual eligible for Medicare and Medicaid are defined as those enrolled in Medicare Part A and/or 
Part B and also enrolled in either full coverage Medicaid or one of Medicaid’s Medicare Savings Programs. 
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were higher among seniors with low incomes, racial and ethnic minorities, women, 
seniors taking prescription medications. Heiss et al. (2010) also find healthy individuals 
less likely to enroll in Part D. Maciejewski et al. (2010) find that Part D enrollment was 
correlated with younger age (65–74), female, non-Hispanic white, married or widowed, 
and lower income. Although Mahmoudi and Jensen (2014) find that Part D reduced 
Hispanic/white disparities in annual prescription drug spending, it increased the African 
American/white disparity. A possible explanation is that these groups found to complex 
enrollment process for Part D to be confusing. This argues that Part D could have had 
better outreach towards the poor. However, despite prescription drug coverage rates 
increasing less for minorities, Chen et al. (2011) find that total out-of-pocket payments 
for drugs and probability of having unmet drug needs decreased the most for black 
seniors, followed by Hispanic seniors. 
Medicare Part D increased prescription drug coverage, as well as spending and 
utilization, across the board. Thus, we have reason expect a potential impact on life 
expectancy, particularly on those groups less likely to be able to afford drugs prior to Part 
D.  
 
2.2.3 Contribution 
My contribution to the literature is to look at Medicare Part D’s impact on 
probability of living to age 73, whereas Huh and Reif (2017) and Dunn and Shapiro 
                                                 
The advantage to enrolling in both is greater breadth of healthcare coverage and lower out-of-pocket costs. 
Also, Medicaid provides many long-term care benefits and supports to allow persons to age at home which 
most Medicare does not cover except for a small portion of Medicare Advantage plans. Medicare is always 
the primary payer. Medicaid eligibility is based on income and asset limits and varies by state. The 
individual income limit for institutional/nursing home Medicaid and Medicaid’s Home and Community 
Based Services (HCBS) is $2,313 per month and the asset limit is around $2,000 in 2019. 
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(2017) both focused on the immediate impact on the young-elderly (age 66).25 Using a 
linear probability model instead of a differences-in-differences with near-elderly as a 
control allows me to capture the impact on mortality at older ages. With more years of 
data, I can capture more of the post-Part D effect. In addition, my methodology allows 
me to handle the censoring issue of not yet knowing the total lifespan of all elderly 
Americans. Because Medicare Part D was created in 2006, many recipients are still 
living, meaning we can’t compare their lifespans to those who died before Part D was 
created. Instead, I look at probability of living to age 73, because I do know whether 
every member of my sample who reached at least age 65 by 2006 lived to age 73 in 2014, 
the last year of data currently available in the HRS. This allows me to create a dependent 
variable where I know for a fact whether every member of my sample lived to age 73 or 
not, instead of needing to impute future lifespans. I can also look at exactly how many 
months individuals lived after age 65 due to having data on month of death. 
The Health and Retirement Survey is a rich data source with more details on 
demographics and health conditions than previous studies. This allows me to analyze 
how the impact of Medicare Part D on life expectancy was different by demographics, 
particularly race. This is extremely important as a policy issue due to the ongoing 
lifespan discrepancies between black and white Americans and the racial gap in 
healthcare quality. 
                                                 
25 Huh and Reif (2017) used the near-elderly as a control group and thus used the young-elderly as a 
treatment group. Dun and Shapiro (2017) only had data to look at the impact of Part D one year after roll-
out and thus focused on those age 66 as well. 
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2.3 Data 
My research analyzes the link between Medicare Part D and mortality. I used the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) core files from 1996 to 2014, linked with death data 
from the HRS Tracker file, taken from the National Death Index (NDI) and the HRS 
Ancillary studies, and compiled by RAND. The earliest HRS cohort birth year cohort is 
1890, with subsequent cohorts added every six years, to form a sample representative of 
the U.S. population over age 50. The longitudinal panel study represents a sample of 
approximately 20,000 elderly and near-elderly Americans surveyed every two years. 
Also, the HRS tracker file links with data on mortality from the National Death Index 
(collected by state vital statistics offices). 
Sonnega et al. (2014) find a representative rate of minority participation and 
response rates consistently between 80 and 90 percent. My data set covers 1996 to 
2014,26 and contains 35,025 observations, or about 4,000-8,000 observations per year.   
 
2.3.1 Variables of Interest 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of Medicare Part D on life expectancy. Since 
Medicare Part D is a relatively recent program, created in 2006, we cannot yet know its 
impact on total lifespans. First, I limited my data set to only those who reached age 65, 
the youngest of whom turned 65 in 2006.27 Hence my youngest birth year cohort would 
reach age 73 in 2014, assuming they lived that long. Those seniors who did not live to 
age 65 or those for who were too young to have lived to age 73 were dropped. Therefore, 
                                                 
26 The first year of the HRS was in 1992, but data on drug coverage was not available until 1996. 
27 This may result in some observations being falsely dropped as some people born in 1940 would be 65 
for a good part of 2006, but this is a small loss relative to the entire data set. 
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I was able to create a dummy variable for “lived until age 73, conditional on having lived 
to 65” that could be applied to my entire sample, handling the censoring problem caused 
by mortality.  
Additionally, individuals in my sample experience differential coverage by Part 
D. Those who were 65 in 2006 were covered the entire period, all 8 years, until they 
reached 73. Those who turned 73 in 2006 were covered zero years from 65 to 73. This 
leaves seven groups with partial exposure to Medicare Part D in between. This allowed 
me to create an independent variable for amount of coverage age 65-73 by Medicare Part 
D. Using a linear probability model, I tested the effect of eligibility for Part D drug 
coverage on the probability of living to age 73. The goal of this methodology was to 
come up with a simple way to estimate the impact of Medicare Part D on life expectancy 
by looking at the part of the sample where censoring is not a problem. 
I also dropped those with missing birth year and those with birth year 1930 and 
earlier, as these lacked data at age 64 because they were already older than 64 in 1996, 
my first year of data used. Finally, I dropped those elderly added to the sample who did 
not have data at age 64.  
I interpret “Percent Covered,” my independent variable of interest in the 
regressions, as being the percent of time that age 65-73 that an individual had Medicare 
Part D as an option (assuming they lived for the 8 years). This has nine possible values 
from 0-100%. Medicare Part D should have made coverage near-universally available to 
seniors. For this reason, “Percent Covered” represents the amount of time before reaching 
age 73 that drug coverage was available to a respondent. As previously mentioned, 
healthy seniors selected out of drug coverage, so instead I use whether seniors had the 
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option to take up Medicare Part D, which offered universal coverage. I expect that an 
additional eight years of prescription drug coverage at age 65 should have some effect on 
probability of living to age 73. The sign and significance of the variable “Percent 
Covered” tests this hypothesis. 
 The variable “Percent Covered” also captures increases in generosity of Medicare 
Part D. The original Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 included a gap in drug 
coverage between initial coverage and catastrophic coverage in order to reduce costs, 
colloquially known as the donut hole.28 The Affordable Care Act of 2010 passed 
legislation to phase out this gap over a ten year period from 2011 to 202029 while also 
lowering the out-of-pocket amount necessary to qualify for catastrophic coverage. My 
data covers up to 2014. During this time period, the amount an enrollee had to pay out-of-
pocket for branded drugs while in the coverage gap was 100% in 2010 and earlier, 50% 
in 2011-2012, and 47.5% in 2013-2014. For generic drugs, this went from 100% in 2010 
to 72% in 2014. The out-of-pocket threshold for catastrophic coverage remained stable at 
$4,550 from 2010-2014 due to the ACA slowing its previous growth. The Kaiser Family 
Foundation (Cubanski et al. 2018) estimated that the average enrollee discount on brand-
name medications as a result was $565 in 2011, valued in total at $2.2 billion. They also 
find that out-of-pocket costs for enrollees who reached the donut hole fell substantially 
between 2010-2011, but this trend reversed afterwards.  
As a result, younger seniors in my sample should benefit from not only increased 
exposure to Medicare Part D, but also increasing generosity of the benefit over time. 
Those respondents with a higher value for “Percent Covered” are those born younger 
                                                 
28 This gap does not apply to beneficiaries on the low-income subsidy. 
29 And later changed to 2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. 
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who experienced increasingly generous benefits as well as coverage over a longer period 
of time. Hence my results should be interpreted to capture not only exposure to Part D 
but also increasing benefits of Part D. 
 
2.3.2 Generating Variables 
All of my time-varying variables—self-reported health status, marriage, income 
and assets—are collected at age 64.30 This is because I would expect health status, 
income, and assets to change across ages 65-73. In addition, I cannot collect data on these 
variables for those of my sample who died, so I collect the data while everyone is still 
alive. Income represents the sum of all income in a household (only including respondent 
and spouse, divided by two for couples so it’s consistent for those not married). The log 
transformation on income is meant to deal with the highly positive skewness of income. 
Assets represents the net value of total wealth in a household (excluding second home), 
calculated as the sum of all wealth components less all debt. I also took the log of assets. 
My race categories are White,31 Black Non-Hispanic, Other Non-Hispanic, and Hispanic 
Non-White. These are based off the race categories used in similar studies such as Levy 
and Weir (2010). The omitted category is Black Non-Hispanic. Education has eight 
categories, but for the sake of space only four-year college degree and high school degree 
is included in my tables.32 No degree is the omitted category. Although data on state of 
residence exists in the HRS, it was masked for respondent confidentiality. 
                                                 
30 For those who answered the survey at an odd year of age, I rounded up; the categories were taken at age 
65 instead. 
31 Which includes both white non-Hispanic and white Hispanic. 
32 The education categories are no degree, GED, high school diploma, two year college degree, four year 
college degree, master degree, professional degree, and degree unknown/some college. 
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One possible concern in my regression is whether the 2008-2009 recession might 
impact life expectancy. Year fixed effects were not an option unless I used panel data, 
which would cause its own problems by repeatedly counting those respondents who lived 
the longest. For this reason, I considered including a variable for whether or not a 
respondent was alive during the recession. However, I found that 93% of my sample was 
alive during the recession, so it would seem likely that any impact would affect the whole 
sample. This could possibly have a downward bias on my results. Thus, if I found a 
positive impact of Part D on life expectancy, this could be an underestimate of the true 
effects of Part D. However, since my key independent variable is a cohort effect not a 
time effect, I would expect the interference to be minimal. 
I divided my sample into those alive at age 73 coded as one (including those who 
died at a later age), and those with a death age of younger than 73 coded as zero. The 
National Death Index (linked with the HRS) contains data on mortality for even those 
who dropped out of my sample. Hence, I was able to come up with a value for living to 
age 73 for every person in the sample. 
As shown in Table 2.1, in total, I found that 83.2% of my sample lived to age 73, 
conditional on reaching age 65. Older cohorts were more likely to live to age 73, ranging 
from around 80% for those born in 1941 to 85% for those born in 1931. However, there 
was a great deal of fluctuation between years; this is likely because my sample sizes are 
relatively small (a little more than 1,000 observations per birth year).  
It’s possible that increasing life expectancy over time could influence my results. 
However, I would argue that because average life expectancy has been above age 73 for 
the entire period, the effect of my variable “percent of years covered by Part D” on 
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mortality at age 73 cannot be entirely attributed to improving technology over time. In 
the United States, life expectancy was 76 years in 2006 and 79 years in 2014. For black 
men, life expectancy increased from 70 years in 2006 to 72 years in 2014. The difference 
is stark. Hence, I would expect to find differences in the impact of Part D on mortality 
based on race. 
To make sure my data matched general mortality patterns, I looked closely at the 
trend in death rates by age group in my sample, compared to what is found in the 
National Vital Statistics Life Tables. National life expectancy for those born in 1930 (my 
sample’s earliest birth year) was actually below age 65. For total population in 2006, 
probability of living to age 73 conditional on living to age 65 was 85.87%. This had risen 
to 87.30% by 2014. My results also found numbers in the mid-eighty percent. For earlier 
years, I wasn’t able to obtain data on probability of living to a given year, since the 
National Vital Statistics measured every five years: the closest available measurement 
was that probability of living to age 75 conditional on living to age 65 in 1996 was 
75.78%. At a glance, this indicates that probability of living to age 73 increased more 
than three times as much from the eleven-year period of 1996 to 2006 than the nine-year 
period of 2006 to 2014. Thus, if I were to find a positive impact on probability of living 
to age 73 due to years of Part D coverage, this would probably not entirely be attributable 
to overall trends in life expectancy, since these trends were stronger for the years prior to 
Part D. 
For black men in 2006, probability of living to age 73 conditional on living to age 
65 was 75.17%, increasing to 78.84% by 2014. Though all groups saw improvements in 
life expectancy, blacks remained worse-off than whites. This indicates more room for 
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improvement in life expectancy among black men. For this reason, I would expect 
Medicare Part D to be more likely to impact mortality for the black population. I was not 
able to obtain data on probability of living to age 73 by race in earlier years.33 Compared 
to the increase in probability of living to age 73 conditional on living to age 65 from the 
National Vital Statistics of 3.7% for black men from 2006 to 2014, my regression results 
below found black men experienced a nine percentage point increase in probability of 
living to age 73. My result is much larger than the overall national trend. Hence my 
findings cannot be entirely attributed to changes in lifespans over time. 
Finally, because my key independent variable “Percent Covered” is a function of 
birthyear, in Table 2.2 I examine summary statistics by sample birth year. I do not find 
any changes in the racial or gender composition of my sample from birth years 1931-
1941. Percent of my sample with only a high school degree and no higher education does 
not change over time, but those born in later years are more likely to have a four-year 
college degree, about an eight percentage point increase from birth years 1931 to 1941. In 
addition, I find evidence of an increasing trend over time towards higher income and 
assets (to the order of a 6 percentage point increase in seniors in the highest income 
category from birth years 1931 to 1941 and a 10 percentage point increase in the highest 
assets category). This could potentially have an upward bias on my results, but the effect 
of higher income and assets should be controlled for by including these as independent 
variables in my regression. Based on Table 2.2, I do not believe that I find any large 
differences across birth years which will influence my results. 
                                                 
33 The National Vital Statistics published less-detailed tables in earlier years. 
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2.4 Summary Statistics 
2.4.1 Changes in Elderly Drug Coverage 
My findings suggest that Medicare Part D led to about a 15% increase in 
prescription drug coverage among seniors, from 76% to 90% (Figure 1.1).34 Levy and 
Weir (2010), Donohue (2014), Heiss et al. (2010), and Neuman et al. (2009) support this 
90% rate of prescription drug coverage for seniors post-Part D. For the near-elderly (55-
64), drug coverage lingered around 70-80%, increasing over time. This intuitively makes 
sense, because before Part D the elderly would not have a significant advantage in 
obtaining drug coverage, although might still have slightly higher rates due to access to 
Medicare. 
Before Medicare Part D, elderly Americans obtained prescription drug coverage 
through private plans, certain types of Medicare including Medigap and HMOs, 
Medicaid, and/or long-term care insurance. After Part D rolled out in January of 2006, 
seniors could enroll in a Part D plan or retain their existing coverage. Medicaid-covered 
Medicare beneficiaries (i.e. dual eligibles) were automatically enrolled in Part D and 
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans/Medicare HMOs were required to offer drug coverage 
if they didn’t already. Medicare Part D plan costs vary by income level, charging more to 
seniors with higher income. For those with lower incomes and assets, Medicare Part D 
has a means-tested subsidy to help cover premiums, deductibles and copayments. 
Mortality is an extreme outcome, and even if Medicare Part D did not move the 
needle there, it likely had other health effects. An increase in drug coverage of 15% is 
                                                 
34 Across all years, health insurance rates among the over 65 age group remain around 98-99%. This is as 
expected, since Medicare offers insurance to all seniors. 
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large enough to suggest a possible change in life expectancy. The effect might be 
stronger for those demographic groups who previously reported difficulty paying for 
medications: minorities, the less-educated, and those with lower incomes.  
2.5 Theoretical Predictions 
2.5.1 Medicare Part D’s Impact by Demographic Factors 
Medicare Part D made prescription drug coverage significantly more available to 
all seniors. I would expect the 15% increase in coverage demonstrated in the last section 
to disproportionately benefit disadvantaged groups who could not afford coverage prior 
to turning age 65—minorities, the less-educated, and those with lower incomes. 
However, my own results find that those who were more educated and with 
higher income/assets experienced greater gains in coverage rates after Part D. This poses 
a different question about the efficiency of Part D. However, drug coverage did increase 
for all groups post-2006. By race, take-up was virtually identical. As shown in Table 2.3, 
about 24% took up Part D plans for both the total population and the black population. 
Furthermore, about 10% remained without coverage for both groups.  
Looking at mean drug coverage prior to Medicare Part D, the means are largely as 
expected: lower for the less educated, the non-white, and those with lower income/assets 
(Table 1.6). The largest gap is between Hispanic and non-Hispanic. The black population 
actually had slightly higher rates of coverage compared to the white population (likely 
due to those in worse health usually having higher health insurance coverage rates). Also 
using the HRS, Levy and Weir find that higher rates of Medicaid coverage for minorities 
in 2004 meant that non-Hispanic whites were, surprisingly, more likely to lack drug 
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coverage before Part D. Every group benefitted from Part D. However, since the black 
population already had slightly higher rates of coverage, this means they had less benefit 
from Part D. 
As mentioned in previously, the literature is somewhat mixed on whether Part D 
reached all groups equally. Levy and Weir (2010) find that Part D “erased socioeconomic 
gradients in drug coverage among the elderly.” Conversely, Maciejewski et al. (2010) 
and Neuman et al. find Part D had difficulty reaching certain disadvantaged groups. All 
of these studies find that drug coverage increased for all groups post-2006; the only 
question is to what extent racial disparities were erased.  
My own results show huge across-the-board increases in drug coverage. We 
would expect these increases to impact health and perhaps mortality. In addition, the 
driving mechanism may be quality of coverage. Prior to Part D, minorities were more 
likely to be covered by Medicaid or “other” coverage (Table 2.3), which means that 
shifting to Part D plans may have represented an improvement in care. Women 
disproportionately benefited from Part D, switching from being less likely to have 
coverage to being more likely. Marriage also became positively correlated with coverage 
for those eligible for Part D. 
 
2.5.2 Should Medicare Part D Impact Mortality? 
 Mortality is the most visible health outcome in any data set: unlike the HRS’s 
measures of health, it does not rely on self-reported assessment of one’s own condition. 
In the previous section, I have made an argument that drug coverage should have an 
impact on mortality, due to its importance in major causes of death such as heart attacks. 
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According to Dunn and Shapiro (2017), heart disease is the leading cause of death in the 
United States and about half of U.S. drug expenditures go towards treatments to prevent 
cardiovascular-related deaths. Huh and Reif (2017) found a significant increase in the 
utilization of drugs to treat heart disease after Part D, and that cardiovascular drugs were 
the largest category of drug expenditures and utilization by far, increasing by 25-30% 
after Part D rollout. 
Interestingly, my results would have policy implications regardless of if I reject 
my null hypothesis. If Medicare Part D can be shown to have an impact on probability of 
living to age 73, this demonstrates that it had a clear impact on health outcomes of 
seniors, even extreme outcomes such as mortality. If Part D had a stronger impact on 
groups less likely to afford prescription drug coverage without government intervention, 
such as black men, this would serve to illustrate the benefits of the program. However, if 
Medicare Part D did not move the needle on life expectancy, even for groups that 
previously reported higher rates of cost-related medication nonadherence, then this 
implies that outreach of Medicare Part D may have been inefficient. The truth may also 
lie somewhere in the middle. 
2.6 Main Results 
2.6.1 Regressions 
I used a linear probability model to estimate the impact of percent of years 65-73 
potentially covered by Medicare Part D on probability of living to 73. I clustered my 
standard errors by birth year. My demographic variables were all measured at age 64-65. 
My equation is: 
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Alive at 73im= β0 + β1Percent Covered + β2-19Xi + ε                         (2.1) 
 As shown in Table 2.4, my results were insignificant for the variable of interest, 
percent of age 65-73 covered by the existence of Medicare Part D. The coefficient of 
interest was near zero and positive. I would expect exposure to Part D to increase life 
expectancy, which is line with my positive coefficient, but I fail to reject my null 
hypothesis. My R-squared was 0.0747.  
Self-reporting better health had a positive and significant impact on life 
expectancy. Marriage and log-income were positive but insignificant, whereas assets had 
a positive significant effect.35 As expected, being white had a positive impact on life 
expectancy and being Hispanic had a negative impact, but these results were 
insignificant. Schooling was near-zero and insignificant. Finally, being female had highly 
significant positive affect. These coincide with the factors I expected to have a positive 
effect on life expectancy. 
Because the HRS includes data on month of death, an alternative methodology 
would be for me to look at each additional month lived past age 65 for each member of 
my sample. Thus, my dependent variable would be a range of values from 0 to 96 for 
number of months lived from age 65 to 73 (over an 8 year period). My sample contains 
8,657 people who lived 96 months or longer (those alive past age 73) and 1,329 people 
who lived past age 65 but not to age 73. The average number of months lived is 89.5. 
Table 2.4 also reports the results of running the same regression with months 
lived age 65-73 as the new dependent variable. As in the previous methodology, the 
coefficient of interest, percent of time covered by Medicare Part D, was near-zero and 
                                                 
35 Although I experimented with including interaction terms for marriage and gender and income and 
employment, these proved insignificant so I did not include them in my final results. 
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insignificant.36 None of the signs on the other independent variables changed 
noticeably.37 
 As mentioned previously, it may be that for my entire sample, the changes in 
probability of living to age 73 by birth year were minimal. Also, Part D would have had 
little effect on the 75% of the population who already had drug coverage. For this reason, 
in my next regressions, I focused on groups most likely to have a disproportionate impact 
from Medicare Part D.  
 Next, I stratified my results by gender and race. The life expectancy of black 
Americans is 3.4 years lower than white Americans as of 2014, leaving more room from 
improvement from Medicare Part D (Tavernise 2016). For men, U.S. life expectancy is 
77 years for white men relative to 72 years for black men and has also improved less 
since 2006 (Measures of America 2014). Much of this is driven by disparities in income, 
and furthermore inequality in life expectancy across income has been increasing over 
time in the U.S. (Chetty et al. 2016). The black population also has significantly lower 
rates of upward mobility than the white population, primarily driven by different rates of 
wages and employment among men (Chetty et al. 2018). The ongoing racial gap in 
healthcare quality between black and white Americans make this a very important policy 
question. 
                                                 
36 The coefficient was -0.08, which would be interpreted as living 2 days less for an additional 8 years of 
Medicare Part D coverage. Although I would not expect the effect to be negative, it is so small, and 
completely insignificant, as to be disregarded. 
37 Oddly, a college degree shows an insignificant negative impact on probability of living to age 73. 
However, when I experimented with dropping variables, changing which category is omitted for education, 
and changing how degree was calculated, this finding did not prove robust. 
57 
 
Looking at a sample of only black men,38 the impact of Medicare Part D becomes 
much more pronounced. I found an additional 9 percentage point chance of living to 73 
for an additional 8 years of exposure. This coefficient was significant at the 5% level. 
The lower significance level may be the result of a smaller sample, only 403 
observations. The results are shown in Table 2.5. My R-squared was 0.087. As expected, 
marriage and being in good health had significant positive impacts on life expectancy. 
Income, assets, and education were insignificant.39 
As in the previous section, I also looked at months lived from age 65-73 for black 
men. I found an additional five months lived if fully covered by Medicare Part D, 
significant at the 10% level. The signs of the other independent variables remained 
similar. Both methodologies support a positive impact of Medicare Part D on life 
expectancy for black men. The second regression is likely to have a more precise 
coefficient due to measuring exactly how many months an individual lived after age 65. 
Given that black men are a group who previously reported greater difficulties in paying 
for prescription drugs, this result is suggestive that Medicare Part D helped improve 
health for male racial minorities. Overall, I am confident in the direction of the effect, 
which is consistent across regressions, more so than the magnitude. 
I also examined the probability of living to age 71-66 for black men. Focusing on 
age 71, I found black men had an additional 8 percentage point chance of living to 71 for 
                                                 
38 Sample size of 403. 
39 College degree had an insignificant negative impact on probability of living to age 73. However, this 
impact was not robust to which category was omitted and different methods of calculating the education 
categories. Also, only 67 black men in my sample had a college degree (out of a sample of 403) so a small 
sample size could have potentially influenced my results. 
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an additional 8 years of coverage. This coefficient was significant at the 10% level (very 
near to the 5% level). 
In Table 2.6, I examined the impact of eligibility for Part D coverage on black 
women, Hispanic women, Hispanic men, white women, and white men. For black 
women, I found a near-zero insignificant effect, indicating the impact of Medicare Part D 
on the black population is being entirely driven by men. Percent of time covered by Part 
D had a positive effect on probability of living to age 73 for Hispanic men, although the 
coefficient was small and insignificant. However, for Hispanic women and white women, 
the impact was actually very slightly negative and insignificant. For women, the impact 
of Part D is similar to the near-zero coefficients I find for the total population. The impact 
for white men was positive but near-zero and insignificant. Overall, this indicates that 
Part D coverage mattered more for men. This may reflect that men are more likely to die 
before age 73. The impact was only significant and substantial in size for men in racial 
minorities. Finally, those who reported having no prescription drug coverage in 2004 had 
an insignificant positive correlation with probability of living to age 73. 
 I also analyzed the probably of living to ages 66-73 for my whole sample, and for 
black men in particular. For the total sample, the results were insignificant every year 
except age 66, where I found a tiny positive effect (Table 2.7). This is interesting because 
Huh and Reif (2017) also looked at age 66 (using the near-elderly as a control) and found 
a positive impact on life expectancy. I hesitate to draw strong conclusions. However, this 
could indicate that there was pent-up demand for prescription drug coverage among the 
near-elderly, giving them a brief boost in health when they first obtained access to 
Medicare. For example, Card et al. (2008) find that once elderly in the United States 
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become eligible for Medicare at age 65, they increase their use of medical services, 
including bypass surgery and joint replacement. This also ties in with the literature which 
suggests that Medicare Part D had a larger impact on cardiovascular mortality,40 and 
which is also supported by my examinations of heart attack mortality later in this paper. 
Finally, having a larger impact on mortality in younger years argues against the effect 
being entirely due to increasing lifespans due to improving medical technology over time, 
as this would be more likely to impact later years. 
For the black male population (Table 2.8) I consistently found a positive impact 
on life expectancy from ages 66-73, although the magnitude and the significance level 
changed. I would hesitate to draw conclusions about magnitudes because of the low 
significance levels of my regressions. Furthermore, significance levels change depending 
on which independent variables I include. However, Table 2.8 does give me confidence 
in the direction of the effect of Medicare Part D on black men, since it was robust across 
all regressions. 
 
2.6.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Based on my findings for improvements in life expectancy among black men, I 
attempted a rough cost-benefit analysis of Medicare Part D. First, I let value of one life-
year saved be $100,000-$200,000. I chose not to use value of a statistical life saved 
because my regression allows me to be more specific, looking at each extra month of life. 
Intuitively, it would seem that value of a statistical year of life might vary based on 
quality of life and age, and thus each year would be worth less to those of an older age. 
                                                 
40 The average age for a first attack is 66 for men and 70 for women (Woolston 2016). 
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However, economics studies do not tend to find that the elderly or those with chronic 
conditions are willing to pay less for an extra year of life (Aldy and Viscusi 2007, 
Alberini et al. 2004). The value of statistical year of life lived traditionally does not 
discount for age. I use a range for this value: $100,000 from Cutler (2004) to $200,000 
from Alberini (2005). I’m able to obtain the most precise estimates by using my second 
regression finding: that black men live an extra 5 months for an additional 8 years of 
Medicare Part D coverage. Multiplied by $100,000-200,000, this generates a range of 
$41,667-$83,333. Based on the total black male elderly population in 2006, this becomes 
729,000*[$41,667-$83,333] = $30.4-$60.8 billion. The total cost of Medicare Part D 
from 2006-2014 is $499 billion, adding together CBO costs for each year. Then if I 
multiply this by the percent of the elderly population which was black and male, I get the 
total cost for black male population as $16.5 billion. Given that $499 billion > $60.8 
billion > $30.4 billion > $16.5 billion, my conclusion is that Medicare Part D was cost-
effective for black men but not for the entire population.  
This raises an issue of targeting, as I find benefits for the black population but not 
the population as a whole. Black men are only a small portion of the total elderly 
population, around 3.3% in 2006. However, there would likely be other health benefits 
from increased drug coverage besides mortality.41 Also, Medicaid drug spending should 
                                                 
41 My literature review finds that Medicare Part D led to decreases in medication nonadherence, 
hospitalizations and emergency room care. These health outcomes also deserve to be considered when 
assessing the program’s effectiveness. For example, Dall et al. (2013) find upwards of $22.4 billion 
potential Medicare savings over 10 years due to reduced hospitalization from congestive heart failure due 
to increased medication adherence post Part D. 
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have fallen due to seniors shifting to Part D drug plans.42 Thus, my estimate should be 
considered a lower bound for the benefits of Medicare Part D.  
Additionally, I calculate that based on the increase of 9 percentage points in 
probability of living to age 73 for black men, this implies 65,610 lives saved as of 2014. 
This represents an important health gain for seniors in America. 
There are several possible mechanisms through which Medicare Part D might 
impact life expectancy for black men but not the whole population of seniors. The 
improvements in probability of living to age 73 for black men were primarily driven by 
cardiovascular mortality, as discussed in my Additional Results section below. As 
previously mentioned, prior studies looking at the impact of Part D on mortality have also 
found heart disease to be the most important mechanism (Dunn and Shapiro, 2017, Huh 
and Reif, 2017). Black seniors are disproportionally likely to be affected by heart failure, 
particularly men. The prevalence starts at an earlier age, is more likely to be fatal, and has 
seen less improvement over time than the white population (Sharma et al. 2014). Also, 
age 73 is closer to the end of life for black men since their life expectancy in the U.S. is 
72 years. For these reasons, I would expect to see a stronger effect of increased access to 
heart disease medication among the black population, starting at a younger death age. It is 
possible that once more years of data are available in the HRS, allowing me to look at 
probability of living to an age older than 73, there may be more of an impact on the white 
population (and for black women). 
In addition, one mechanism through which the black population might be affected 
would be that three times as many black enrollees moved from Medicaid to Medicare 
                                                 
42 McWilliams et al. (2011) find that after Part D, nondrug medical spending declined significantly for 
seniors with limited prior drug coverage, a category which includes Medicaid enrollees. 
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Part D as white enrollees—9% and 3% respectively (Table 2.3). Although Medicaid 
offers drug coverage, the quality varies wildly across states, many of which limit 
enrollees to generic drugs with higher copays for drugs on their non-approved list. States 
with more stringent Medicaid eligibility and limits on number of prescriptions filled per 
month also had higher rates of cost-related medication skipping (Safran et al. 2012). Prior 
to Part D, Cunningham (2005) found that a fifth of all Medicaid enrollees reported 
trouble paying for their prescription drugs. In addition, Miller et al. (2008) found that 
10% of Medicaid enrollees reported spending more than 10% of their income on 
healthcare, and this was driven by prescription drug costs. If Medicaid was not an 
adequate source of drug coverage, we might expect to see health effects among seniors 
who switched to Part D post-2006. Neuman et al. (2007) find that out-of-pocket spending 
on drugs and rates of medicate nonadherence full much more for those Medicaid 
beneficiaries who were automatically enrolled in the low-income subsidy. After 2006, 
they find rates of out-of-pocket spending on drugs greater than $300 per month were 
significantly lower for low-income subsidy recipients (many of whom dual eligible 
previously covered by Medicaid drug coverage) than for other Part D enrollees even 
though lower income seniors reported greater usage of drugs. They also found higher 
rates of out-of-pocket spending among the near-poor not eligible for the low-income 
subsidy. Hence, Part D decreased costs more for low-income beneficiaries who 
previously relied on Medicaid drug coverage. 
My own findings in the HRS suggest that the percent of the population who 
reported only having part of their drug costs covered as opposed to full coverage declined 
after Part D’s rollout. Thus, the larger portion of black seniors switching from Medicaid 
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to Medicare Part D could also lead to great health effects among this population. All of 
these factors likely influenced my findings of improvements in life expectancy among 
black men. 
 
2.6.3 Robustness Checks 
I ran a series of regressions eliminating each of my independent variables. For my 
total population, no matter which variables I eliminated, my coefficient of interest was 
always statistically near-zero and insignificant. 
Next, I focused particularly on my regression for black men. Eliminating the 
dummies for health, assets, marriage, and education had minimal effects on the 
regression. The coefficient remained in the 0.8-0.11 range, significant at the 10-15% 
level. The only real change came from removing the dummy for the natural log of income 
at age 64. Although the coefficient of interest remained about the same, it became 
insignificant. Given the well-documented correlation between race and income, it is not 
surprising that this variable in particular would have an impact on my regression. 
For additional robustness checks, I also ran the same regression with a logistic 
probability model, and found that black men had 1.7 times greater odds of living to age 
73, significant at the 5% level. (Again, the entire population was insignificant). Finally, I 
also used an interaction term of percent covered and black men and found a coefficient of 
0.04, though it was insignificant. These results, reported in Table 2.9, indicate a positive 
impact of Part D on mortality for black men, regardless of the methodology used. 
Another possible concern is that my results could contain a rebound effect, as 
described in Dunn and Shapiro (2017), who find that Medicare Part D improved the 
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survival of people with a chronic health condition immediately, which then caused the 
mortality rate to “rebound” in later years. To test whether this exists in my data, I ran a 
regression including only up to birth year 1938. I found an insignificant, near-zero 
coefficient, which makes a rebound effect less likely. 
 
2.6.4 Placebo Test 
One final potential issue with my regression results would be the possibility that 
my variable of interest is capturing improvements in life expectancy over time due to 
technological advancement, instead of the impact of Medicare Part D. My key 
independent variable, Percent Covered, is entirely based off respondent birth year. Thus, 
any other factors which might affect probability of living to age 73 for those born later 
would be wrapped up into the coefficient of this variable. 
An omitted variable bias problem exists in separating out the effects of Part D as 
opposed to any other cohort trends which might impact life expectancy. The most 
obvious issue is that life expectancy is improving over time, so those born later would 
expect to live slightly longer. General macroeconomic trends such as recessions could 
affect respondents differently depending on how old they were when the event occurred. 
The same holds true for any other governmental change impacting health. 
In order to test whether or not Percent Covered is picking up other trends in life 
expectancy over time, I used a placebo test. First, I created a new variable for Percent 
Covered as if Medicare Part D was created in 199743 instead of 2006. By creating a fake 
                                                 
43 I picked 1997 so that my fake Medicare Part D exposure variable would have no overlap with the real 
Part D. 
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Medicare Part D nine years prior to the real one, I could then form a new Percent 
Covered variable using birth years 1925 to 1932. This did not overlap with the original 
Percent Covered variable used in my actual regression, which used birth years 1933 to 
1941. In my new data set, I once again dropped everyone who did not live to at least age 
65 or who was too young for me to know yet if they lived to age 73. Then I regressed the 
fake Percent Covered against probability of living to age 73, conditional on first living to 
age 65. The goal of this methodology was to test whether or not I still saw a positive 
impact for black men using my fake Medicare Part D. If I obtained a significant positive 
result, that would indicate that Medicare Part D had no actual impact on life expectancy 
and the effect I previously found was entirely due to increasing life expectancy for those 
born later in time. However, if I didn’t obtain a positive coefficient, this would provide 
evidence that trends in life expectancy were not a problem in my regression, since life 
expectancy should have an overall positive trend across both periods of time. 
In order to run my placebo test, I first needed to generate new values for my 
independent variables. Gender, education, and race are all time invariant and thus did not 
need to be recreated. I previously collected income, assets, marriage, and self-reported 
health at ages 64-65 for my sample. However, when looking at earlier birth years, many 
respondents were not surveyed until older than age 64-65 because they entered the 
sample at a later age. I defaulted to using 1996, my earliest available year of data, for 
those respondents. That said, since I am comparing income, assets, marriage, and self-
reported health of respondents at different ages, these variables are all likely to be 
downwardly biased for those surveyed at more advanced ages. 
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For both the total population and black men, I found that my placebo Part D event 
had a significant negative effect on life expectancy. The negative effect was even larger 
for black men than for the total population, providing evidence that improvements in life 
expectancy over time did not cause the positive effect in my main results. If Percent 
Covered was only capturing technological improvements in health over time, I would 
have expected to see this no matter which set of birth years I looked at. Instead, I only 
find a positive impact for the birth year cohort affected by Medicare Part D. 
For birth year cohort to have a negative impact on life expectancy in my placebo 
test was unexpected. Looking at my summary statistics, I noticed that in the very early 
birth years, life expectancy seems to briefly decline before flattening out over time. I 
attribute this largely to small sample sizes. This is likely connected to why I found a 
slight negative impact on life expectancy for younger birth year cohorts. 
In conclusion, my regression passed the placebo test. Despite this, I cannot 
completely rule out the possibility of general macroeconomic trends or other factors 
influencing health over time affecting my regression results, since these could have been 
different from 1997-2005 than 2006-2014. For this reason, I am still more confident in 
the direction of my regression results (a positive effect for black men) than in the 
magnitudes of my coefficients. 
2.7 Additional Results 
Having examined the impact of Medicare Part D on mortality, next I focus on the 
impact on mortality by cause of death. Previous literature has particularly looked at the 
impact of Part D on heart attacks, arguing that cardiovascular mortality is a logical 
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measure to use because of its prevalence as a cause of death and because heart conditions 
are commonly treated through prescription drugs. 
For example, Dunn and Shapiro (2017) also look at if Medicare Part D decreased 
cardiovascular-related mortality. As mentioned above, they argue that access to heart 
attack medication could have an immediate impact on mortality due to heart disease 
being the leading cause of death among the elderly, including the young-elderly as heart 
attacks tend to strike at a younger age than other age-related ailments.44 Using a 
microsimulation approach and including elderly with diabetes as well as cardiovascular 
disease, Semilla et al. (2015) calculate that since the implementation of Part D, about 
200,000 Medicare enrollees have lived at least one year longer, with an average increase 
in longevity of 3.3 years. Finally, Briesacher et al. (2015) estimated a 1% found a decline 
in elderly mortality due to Part D, but their result is not statistically significant. These 
findings are generally consistent with others looking at the effect of Part D on life 
expectancy. 
Papers examining cardiovascular mortality such as Dunn and Shapiro (2017) have 
argued that heart disease-related drug expenditures increased by a significant enough 
margin that Medicare Part D should have had an impact on life expectancy. An alternate 
strategy used is to compare mortality rates of the older than 65 group to the population 
aged 55-64. Another paper using the HRS, O’Rand and Hamil-Luker (2005), used a 
modified pseudo-variables approach, by estimating binary logistic regression models in 
which the likelihood of having a heart attack in each survey year is predicted by health 
status, age, education, race, marital status, and income in the previous year. Beckett 
                                                 
44 Woolston 2016 finds the average age for a first heart attack is 66 for men. 
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(2000) used a similar method with the National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey. 
In 2016, the cost of cardiovascular disease in the U.S. was about $555 billion, or 
$1 of every $6 spent on health care in the U.S. The cost is projected to reach $1.1 trillion 
by 2035 (American Heart Association 2017). Looking at the impact of Part D on 
cardiovascular drug costs for seniors on dialysis, Frankenfield et al. (2012) found that 
mean out-of-pocket monthly costs for cardiovascular medications were $49.59, reduced 
to $3.44 for seniors with the low-income subsidy and $49.59 for other Part D seniors. 
However, mean total costs for patients using the low-income subsidy were actually 
higher, $124.02 per month relative to $110.32. These costs represented 21.9% of total 
drug costs for seniors with the low-income subsidy and 30.7% for those without. In 
addition, the costs of the most commonly used cardiovascular medications for seniors 
have been rising over time (Watanabe et al. 2018). Finally, greater out-of-pocket costs for 
heart disease medication is associated with reductions in utilization, with lower adherence 
rates for non-whites (Holmes et al. 2010, Karaca‐Mandic et al. 2013). 
The Health and Retirement study includes a variable on cause of death. 
Cardiovascular mortality is grouped together under cause of death as “Heart, circulatory 
and blood conditions.” Respondents can have up to two causes of death. As Table 2.11 
below shows, heart conditions represent a little more than a third of all deaths across all 
years. Note that this table only includes the primary cause of death, not the secondary 
one. Otherwise the totals would not add up to 100%. 
Examining the percent of the entire sample who died of a heart condition by year, 
I found that as many as 40% of all deaths in the HRS sample had heart conditions listed 
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as a cause of death (Table 2.12).45 In both tables, heart conditions stand out as the leading 
cause of mortality in my sample. This is expected since heart disease is the top cause of 
death in the United States. 
Table 2.12 shows a decline in percent of deaths due to heart conditions post 
Medicare Part D, although it starts in 2008, not 2006. The share of cardiovascular-related 
deaths shifts from the low 40 percentile to the high 30 percentile and continues declining 
over time, with 2014 having the lowest number at 33%. Since this looks at percent of 
deaths, not number of deaths, this indicates that Part D may have had more impact on 
heart conditions compared to other causes of death.  
Next, I look at the percent of deaths caused by heart, circulatory and blood 
conditions among only men. The overall percent of deaths caused by heart conditions 
seems to be slightly lower for men. The literature suggests cardiovascular mortality is 
higher among non-senior men, but women steeply increase in risk at around 60 years of 
age to eventually overtake men (Mikkola et al. 2013). Since the HRS looks at an elderly 
population, then I would expect men to have a smaller percent of deaths due to heart 
disease deaths than women. Men also show a decline in heart attack mortality after 
Medicare Part D, although a smaller decrease in terms of percentages.46 
Finally, I looked at heart disease among black respondents. The sample sizes were 
small enough to label my results suspect: only 60-100 deaths per year. This is likely why 
the percentages do not show a clear pattern over time. As a result, it is difficult to draw 
any conclusions about the impact of Medicare Part D. However, looking at all years 
                                                 
45 This number is higher than in Table 2.9 because it includes those who listed heart conditions as a 
secondary cause of death and another cause as a primary cause of death. Using this methodology, the totals 
for causes of death would be higher than 100% since about a third of the deceased had two causes of death. 
46 Possibly connected to my earlier findings that Medicare Part D take-up was higher among women. 
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(where the sample size would be largest) it appears that cardiovascular mortality was 
slightly higher as a share of death among the black population, which would fit the 
literature about lack of healthcare access and disease prevalence among minorities. Since 
Table 2.12 looks at share of deaths, not number of deaths, and lack of care could affect 
many causes of deaths, the higher rates of heart disease among the black population 
relative to the white population may be underestimated. 
Next, I examined the impact of Medicare Part D on cardiovascular mortality. I 
used the same method as my previous regressions on Medicare Part D and mortality. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable, with 1 representing a cardiovascular cause of 
death and 0 otherwise.47 “Percent Covered,” my independent variable of interest in the 
regressions, is the percent of time that age 65-73 that an individual could have taken up 
Medicare Part D if they chose to. I would expect a negative coefficient as Medicare Part 
D should decrease the probability of seniors dying from heart conditions. 
As expected, Medicare Part D coverage was negatively correlated with dying of a 
heart attack (see Table 2.13). I found 8 percentage points less of a chance of dying from a 
heart condition for an additional 8 years of coverage, significant at the 1% level. This 
result matches my expectations and what others have found concerning the impact of 
additional drug coverage on cardiovascular mortality. 
There is a potential selection bias issue because my sample is aging over time. 
Also, heart death disease rate has naturally dropped over time due to improving health 
technology. Finally, not all heart attack mortality can be captured prior to age 73. For this 
                                                 
47 I counted those with heart conditions as a secondary cause of death also as 1. Those who died but did not 
list heart attack as a primary or secondary cause of death were coded as 0 along with those still alive at age 
73. 
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reason, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions (particularly about the magnitudes of the 
impact). 
Next, I focused my regression on black men. In Table 2.14, I found black men 
had an 11 percentage points less of a chance of dying from a heart condition for an 
additional 8 years of coverage. This was significant at the 1% level. Intuitively and based 
on my summary statistics, the impact of Part D should be stronger for black men. This 
also matches my findings for overall mortality. 
Examining only black respondents, I also found a significant negative correlation, 
showing stronger improvements in cardiovascular mortality than total mortality. For 
every demographic group, Medicare Part D led to a decrease in cardiovascular mortality. 
However, the negative correlation is the largest for black men. This matches my already 
existing findings that Medicare Part D helped expand coverage and improve health for 
groups who previously reported difficulty paying for prescription drugs and higher rates 
of cost-related medication nonadherence. 
 
2.7.1 Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
This section uses a Cox Proportional Hazards Model to look at the impact of 
Medicare Part D on mortality. I chose not to use this methodology in my initial analysis 
because I had a simpler strategy for handling the censoring issue which did not require 
me to make assumptions about the lifespans of those respondents still living. However, 
there is value in comparing the two methods to see if the results are similar as a 
robustness check. 
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I estimated the hazard ratio for mortality before and after 2006 (when Medicare 
Part D was established), adjusting for risk factors such as age, race, sex, income, and 
assets.48 I also examined cardiovascular mortality in particular. 
For any study, a serious problem in examining the impact of Medicare Part D is 
that after death, individuals no longer have an effect on overall group health conditions or 
drug expenditures. Thus, a higher mortality rate could falsely lead to an appearance of 
improving health. Prior to Medicare Part D, it may very well be that fewer seniors 
reported worsening heart conditions if mortality due to heart conditions improved after 
Part D. Other studies examining health outcomes of the elderly have handled similar 
issues. One method is to lump various health outcomes together, including morality, and 
create categories based on degrees of severity. Waheed et al. (2015) uses this method 
when looking at cardiovascular outcomes in the elderly population: by including 
mortality in their risk classification system they make sure to capture any censoring 
impact. Also, Shih (2002) suggests conducting sensitivity analyses on different scenarios 
concerning those who drop out of clinical trials, possibly due to mortality. Wu and Bailey 
(1988) and Klein and Moeschberger (2005) discuss many different conceptual models 
that can be used in cases of right censoring caused by mortality. Finally, Lunn and 
McNeil (1995) recommend that in cases of competing risks in survival analysis, the Cox 
Proportional Hazards Model should use a data duplication method. 
The goal of the Cox Proportional Hazards Model is to deal with this selection bias 
issue in examining the impact of Medicare Part D on mortality. In a Cox Proportional 
Hazards Model, this problem is called random censoring. The analysis includes an 
                                                 
48 Using the same independent variables as in my main regression. 
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indicator variable if the observation is terminated by death and a likelihood function for 
censored data. 
Mortality poses the largest problem for studies without death data, which may not 
even be able to distinguish between members of the sample who dropped out or died. 
Since I have data on mortality, I can include this as an outcome. My Cox Proportional 
Hazards Model uses right censoring techniques. 
In Table 2.15, the model uses death as the “failure” event. This time, I look at 
total lifespan instead of probability of living to age 73. The advantage to using a Cox 
Proportional Hazards Model is that it allows me to examine total lifespans. This also 
allows me to use my entire data set instead of dropping those who would not have lived 
to at least age 73 in 2014. Once again, percent of years covered by Medicare is my key 
independent variable to better serve as a robustness check. Table 2.15 looks at the impact 
of Part D on the total population. The log-likelihood is -13118.444 and the overall model 
is significant. I find a positive effect of an additional 8 years of Medicare Part D coverage 
on last age reached, to the order of a 9% lower chance of dying. However, the hazard 
ratio is insignificant. I expected that Medicare Part D should decrease the hazard rate of 
dying. Not surprisingly, I also find women, those married, and those with greater income, 
those in better health, and those with more education have longer lifespans. It is 
interesting that I find a positive effect on the whole population using a Cox Proportional 
Hazards Model, but not using a linear probability model. However, the Cox Proportional 
Hazards Model result is insignificant and there is a possibility of censoring issues. The 
Cox Proportional Hazards Model attempts to use right-censoring techniques to calculate 
the total lifespans of those members of my sample who have not died yet, but there could 
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still be upward bias in my result, making it look like people are living longer in later 
years when actually there hasn’t yet been time to discover their total lifespan. 
Comparatively, the linear probability model uses a dependent variable where I know for a 
fact if every member of my sample lived to age 73 or not. This is likely to be the more 
accurate result. 
As in my previous section using the linear probability model, next I stratify my 
results by race and gender. In Table 2.16, I find that percent of years covered by 
Medicare Part D results in a 30% lower probability of dying for the black male 
population. Again, this result is insignificant. 
Using the Cox Proportional Hazards Model, my results support my hypothesis 
that Part D had a positive impact on life expectancy. 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
Looking at the relationship between living to age 73 and percent of the 65-73 age 
range potentially covered by Medicare Part D, I obtained insignificant, near zero results 
for the total population. However, focusing on the groups most likely to be affected by 
Part D, I found that percent of time covered by Part D had a significant positive effect on 
life expectancy. The greatest effect was for black men, with a weaker correlation for all 
black respondents and those who reported no prescription drug coverage in 2004 (prior to 
Part D). These results suggest that Medicare Part D improved access to prescription 
drugs, even improving health enough to impact life expectancy. For historically 
disadvantage groups, this was a hugely important health gain. 
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My findings indicate that for certain demographics groups which tend to be 
poorer and disadvantaged, Medicare Part D had a positive impact on life expectancy. 
This is not to cast judgement on Medicare Part D as a good or bad program. However, it 
does appear to have moved the needle on its targeted goal: to improve the health of those 
who, without government intervention, had the least access to prescription drug coverage. 
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Table 2.1: Percent of Sample Still Alive at Age 73 by Birth Year 
 
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Number Alive at 73 133 135 145 175 153 150 
Total 744 764 685 777 790 782 
Percent Alive at 73 84.8% 85.0% 82.5% 81.6% 83.8% 83.9% 
  1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 Total 
  174 184 226 207 222 2,118 
  836 831 834 850 846 10,477 
  82.8% 81.9% 78.7% 80.4% 79.2% 83.2% 
 
  
77 
 
Table 2.2: Demographics by Birth Year 
 Birth 
Years 
1931-
1933
49 
Birth 
Year 
1934
50 
Birth 
Year 
1935
51 
Birth 
Year 
1936
52 
Birth 
Year 
1937
53 
Birth 
Year 
1938
54 
Birth 
Year 
1939
55 
Birth 
Year 
1940
56 
Birth 
Year 
1941
57 
Percent of 
Sample 
White 
Non-
Hispanic 71.6% 70.8% 70.4% 70.7% 70.6% 70.5% 67.5% 68.1% 71.0% 
Percent of 
Sample 
Black Non-
Hispanic 16.5% 17.5% 17.6% 17.6% 15.2% 15.9% 16.8% 16.0% 16.0% 
Percent of 
Sample 
Other Non-
Hispanic 1.9% 1.8% 2.5% 2.5% 2.2% 1.6% 2.5% 2.9% 2.0% 
Percent of 
Sample 
Hispanic 
Non-White 3.1% 3.3% 2.5% 3.0% 3.7% 4.0% 4.6% 4.3% 3.3% 
Percent of 
Sample 
Hispanic 
White 6.8% 6.6% 7.1% 6.2% 8.2% 8.0% 8.7% 8.7% 7.8% 
Percent of 
Sample 
Female 53.4% 52.9% 50.7% 53.4% 54.1% 54.5% 52.0% 54.0% 53.6% 
Percent of 
Sample 
Reporting 
Best Health 
at Age 64 15.0% 13.7% 12.4% 9.3% 10.7% 10.7% 10.6% 12.2% 11.5% 
                                                 
49 Percent Covered = 0 
50 Percent Covered = 0.125 
51 Percent Covered = 0.25 
52 Percent Covered = 0.375 
53 Percent Covered = 0.5 
54 Percent Covered = 0.625 
55 Percent Covered = 0.75 
56 Percent Covered = 0.875 
57 Percent Covered = 1 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Percent of 
Sample 
with Only 
High 
School 
Degree 34.1% 36.1% 34.2% 37.6% 36.2% 39.2% 33.4% 34.3% 36.1% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with Only 
4-year 
College 
Degree 33.4% 33.3% 35.0% 37.9% 34.1% 32.6% 39.3% 42.1% 41.2% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with 
Income 
<$12,000 14.1% 14.9% 12.4% 11.0% 10.1% 10.2% 8.9% 9.5% 9.8% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with 
Income 
$12,000-
$30,000 25.1% 22.9% 22.2% 19.8% 22.2% 20.3% 19.8% 18.8% 15.7% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with 
Income 
$30,000-
$100,000 36.6% 35.4% 32.1% 40.0% 37.0% 36.3% 35.2% 35.7% 35.3% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with 
Income 
>$100,000 6.6% 8.5% 9.6% 9.0% 8.8% 9.1% 10.3% 12.4% 13.1% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with Assets 
< $7,263 10.6% 11.2% 11.9% 10.3% 10.2% 10.9% 9.5% 8.9% 10.5% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with Assets 
$7,263-
68,839 18.1% 17.4% 15.2% 13.3% 16.7% 12.4% 16.3% 14.2% 14.3% 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Percent of 
Sample 
with Assets 
$68,839-
205,985 24.2% 22.4% 23.8% 20.2% 20.6% 23.0% 20.4% 19.5% 17.6% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with Assets 
205,985-
630,754 22.8% 20.7% 20.3% 23.1% 20.3% 18.9% 18.4% 21.3% 21.7% 
Percent of 
Sample 
with Assets 
> $630,754 24.2% 28.3% 28.8% 33.0% 32.2% 34.8% 35.4% 36.1% 35.8% 
Note: Sample size is 9,986. All data collected at ages 64-65. 
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Table 2.3: Categories of Drug Coverage Before and After Part D 
  Medicare Part D Employer 
Medicare 
Advantage/
HMO 
Medicaid Other None Sample 
All Seniors: 
2004 -- 38% 16% 5% 17% 24% 6,690 
All Seniors: 
2006 24% 34% 20% 2% 10% 10% 5,188 
Black 
Seniors: 
2004 
-- 39% 22% 15% 5% 19%  831 
Black 
Seniors: 
2006 
24% 33% 24% 6% 4% 9% 590 
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Table 2.4: Impact of Part D Coverage on Living to Age 73 
 
Reported Alive at 73 Months Alive from Age 65-73 
Percent Covered 0.003 (0.01) -0.077 (0.39) 
Health  
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 0.310 (0.03)*** 16.819 (2.49)*** 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 0.278 (0.03)*** 15.771 (2.63)*** 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 0.235 (0.04)*** 13.238 (2.76)*** 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 0.175 (0.04)*** 10.329 (2.535)*** 
Finances  
Log Income at 64 0.009 (0.01) 0.492 (0.44) 
Log Assets at 64 0.016 (0.00)*** 0.957 (0.20)*** 
Demographics  
Marriage at 64 0.023 (0.02) 1.649 (1.12) 
Dummy for White 0.006 (0.01) 0.049 (0.46) 
Dummy for Other 
Non-Hispanic 0.023 (0.03) 0.384 (1.79) 
Dummy for 
Hispanic Non-
White -0.002 (0.03) -0.149 (1.69) 
Dummy for 
Gender (Woman) 0.062 (0.01)*** 3.275 (0.51)*** 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.012 (0.01) 0.0743 (0.54) 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) -0.006 (0.02) -0.870 (0.88) 
Sample Size 7,098 7,098 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Worst health is the omitted category for health, and Black Non-Hispanic is the omitted 
category for race 
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Table 2.5: Impact of Part D Coverage on Probability of Living to Age 73 for Only Black 
Male Respondents 
 
Reported Alive at 73 Months Alive from Age 65-73 
Percent Covered 0.094 (0.04)** 4.880 (2.53)* 
Health  
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 0.440 (0.11)*** 27.692 (7.54)*** 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 0.325 (0.11)*** 22.625 (7.98)*** 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 0.302 (0.12)*** 20.714 (8.74)*** 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 0.260 (0.10)*** 16.112 (7.72)** 
Finances  
Log Income at 64 0.030 (0.03) 2.132 (1.34) 
Log Assets at 64 0.016 (0.01) 0.733 (0.91) 
Demographics  
Marriage at 64 0.153 (0.07)* 7.338 (3.47)* 
Dummy for High 
School Degree -0.080 (0.05) -5.917 (3.02)* 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) -0.129 (0.10) -3.890 (4.21) 
Sample Size 403 403 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Worst health is the omitted category for health  
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Table 2.6: Impact of Part D Coverage on Living to 73 For Respondents Across Race 
 
Reported 
Alive at 
73: Black 
Women 
Reported 
Alive at 
73: 
Hispanic 
Women 
Reported 
Alive at 
73: 
Hispanic 
Men 
Reported 
Alive at 
73: White 
Women 
Reported 
Alive at 
73: White 
Men 
Percent Covered -0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.026 
(0.20) 
0.037 
(0.23) 
-0.026 
(0.02) 
0.009 
(0.02) 
Health 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 
0.245 
(0.07)*** 
0.287 
(0.26) 
0.243 
(0.38) 
0.257 
(0.07)*** 
0.386 
(0.06)*** 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 
0.175 
(0.08)** 
0.354 
(0.23) 
0.162 
(0.37) 
0.252 
(0.07)*** 
0.333 
(0.06)*** 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 
0.106 
(0.07) 
0.188 
(0.31) 
0.161 
(0.36) 
0.209 
(0.07)** 
0.305 
(0.06)*** 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 
0.053 
(0.06) 
0.178 
(0.20) 
-0.092 
(0.27) 
0.168 
(0.06)** 
0.214 
(0.07)** 
Finances 
Log Income at 64 0.018 
(0.02) 
0.116 
(0.08) 
-0.068 
(0.11) 
0.014 
(0.01)* 
0.019 
(0.01) 
Log Assets at 64 0.010 
(0.01) 
-0.022 
(0.03) 
0.026 
(0.06) 
0.014 
(0.00)** 
0.023 
(0.01)*** 
Demographics 
Marriage at 64 0.035 
(0.06) 
0.500 
(0.22)** 
0.291 
(0.49) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.022 
(0.03) 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.066 
(0.09) 
0.114 
(0.12) 
0.041 
(0.02)** 
0.031 
(0.02) 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 
0.031 
(0.06) 
0.195 
(1.11)* 
0.187 
(0.16) 
0.024 
(0.02) 
-0.007 
(0.03) 
Sample Size 585 62 53 2,833 2,572 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Worst health is the omitted category for health 
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Table 2.7: Impact of Part D Coverage on Living to 66-73 
 Percent Covered 
Coefficient 
Alive at 66 0.01 (0.00)** 
Alive at 67 0.01 (0.00) 
Alive at 68 -0.00 (0.00) 
Alive at 69 0.00 (0.01) 
Alive at 70 -0.00 (0.01) 
Alive at 71 -0.01 (0.00) 
Alive at 72 -0.01 (0.01) 
Alive at 73 0.00 (0.01) 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sample size 7,098. 
 
 
Table 2.8: Impact of Part D Coverage on Living to 66-73 for Only Black Men 
 Percent Covered 
Coefficient 
Alive at 66 0.01 (0.00)* 
Alive at 67 0.03 (0.01)*** 
Alive at 68 0.01 (0.02) 
Alive at 69 0.03 (0.03) 
Alive at 70 0.04 (0.03) 
Alive at 71 0.08 (0.04)* 
Alive at 72 0.07 (0.04)* 
Alive at 73 0.09 (0.04)** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Sample size 403. 
 
 
Table 2.9: Alternative Specifications for Measuring the Impact of Part D Coverage on 
Probability of Living to 73 for Only Black Men 
 Percent Covered 
Coefficient 
Income Bins instead of log 
income (based on quintiles) 0.08 (0.04)* 
Indicator of No Income included 0.09 (0.04)** 
Interaction Variable of Percent 
Covered and Black Men 0.04 (0.01) 
Logistic Probability Model 1.7 times greater odds of 
living to age 73** 
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Table 2.10: Placebo Test Looking at the Impact of Birth Year Cohort 1925 to 1930 on 
Probability of Living to Age 73 
 
Reported Alive at 
Age 73 
Reported Alive at Age 73 for 
Only Black Male Respondents 
Percent Covered -0.126 (0.02)*** -0.245 (0.02)*** 
Health  
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health 0.330 (0.03)*** 0.401 (0.05)*** 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health 0.298 (0.03)*** 0.341 (0.06)*** 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 0.263 (0.03)*** 0.298 (0.07)*** 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health 0.193 (0.03)*** 0.248 (0.06)*** 
Finances  
Log Income 0.005 (0.00) 0.018 (0.02) 
Log Assets 0.015 (0.00)*** 0.020 (0.01) 
Demographics  
Marriage 0.030 (0.01)*** 0.019 (0.03) 
Dummy for White 0.001 (0.01) N/A 
Dummy for Other 
Non-Hispanic 0.025 (0.02) N/A 
Dummy for 
Hispanic Non-
White -0.019 (0.03) N/A 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.001 (0.01) 0.051 (0.04) 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) -0.007 (0.01) -0.120 (0.08) 
Sample Size 8.869 544 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Worst health is the omitted category for health 
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Table 2.11: Cause of Death Across All Years: Percent in Each Category          
Cause of Death Percent 
Cancers and tumors; skin conditions 23.41% 
Musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 1.09% 
Heart, circulatory and blood conditions 36.36% 
Allergies; hay fever; sinusitis; tonsillitis 11.02% 
Endocrine, metabolic and nutritional conditions 3.50% 
Digestive system (stomach, liver, gallbladder, kidney, 
bladder) 
6.94% 
Neurological and sensory conditions 1.93% 
Reproductive system and prostate conditions 0.05% 
Emotional and psychological conditions 0.32% 
Miscellaneous 3.52% 
Other symptoms 3.95% 
Not A Health Condition 0.92% 
None 0.39% 
Other health condition 4.62% 
DK (Don't Know); NA (Not Ascertained) 1.90% 
RF (Refused) 0.08% 
 
 
  
87 
 
Table 2.12: Percent of Total Deaths Caused by Heart, Circulatory and Blood Conditions 
 All Yrs. 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Percent of 
deaths 
caused by 
heart, 
circulatory 
and blood 
conditions 
39.92% 34.19% 48.25% 43.84% 41.86% 42.05% 
Men Only 37.01% 39.23% 37.04% 41.41% 41.81% 36.41% 
Black Only 40.34% 36.54% 37.93% 44.62% 38.78% 47.62% 
 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Percent of 
deaths 
caused by 
heart, 
circulatory 
and blood 
conditions 
41.04% 38.45% 37.70% 33.73% 32.77% 
Men Only 35.83% 40.25% 37.96% 33.33% 30.10% 
Black Only 40.54% 40.74% 38.24% 47.73% 32.63% 
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Table 2.13: Impact of Part D Coverage on Cardiovascular Mortality at Age 73 for Total 
Population 
Died of Heart 
Condition 
Coefficient 
Percent Covered -0.077*** 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 -0.167*** 
Dummy for Second 
Best Health at 64 -0.147*** 
Dummy for Medium 
Health at 64 -0.104*** 
Dummy for Second 
Worst Health at 64 -0.078*** 
Income at 64 0 
Assets Dummy for 
First Category at 64 0.064*** 
Assets Dummy for 
Second Category at 
64 0.047*** 
Assets Dummy for 
Third Category at 
64 0.025*** 
Assets Dummy for 
Fourth Category at 
64 0.003 
Marriage at 64 0.003 
Dummy for Not 
Hispanic 0.030*** 
Dummy for Gender 
(Woman) -0.044*** 
Dummy for High 
School Degree -0.008 
Dummy for College 
Degree (at least 4 
years) -0.011 
Dummy for White 0.029** 
Dummy for Black 0.047*** 
Constant 0.176 
Sample Size 8,643 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 2.14: Impact of Part D on Cardiovascular Mortality at Age 73 for Only Black Male 
Respondents 
Died of Heart 
Condition 
Coefficient 
Percent Covered -0.114*** 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 -0.163*** 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 -0.089** 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 -0.047 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 -0.073 
Income at 64 0.000 
Assets Dummy 
for First 
Category at 64 0.064 
Assets Dummy 
for Second 
Category at 64 0.031 
Assets Dummy 
for Third 
Category at 64 0.023 
Assets Dummy 
for Fourth 
Category at 64 -0.015 
Marriage at 64 -0.105* 
Dummy for Not 
Hispanic -0.275 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.038 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 0.014 
Constant 0.497 
Sample Size 573 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 2.15: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Dying, Total Population 
Total Lifespan Hazard Ratio 
Percent Covered 0.907 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 0.214*** 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 0.270*** 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 0.411*** 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 0.568*** 
Log Income at 64 0.909*** 
Log Assets at 64 0.888*** 
Marriage at 64 0.624*** 
Dummy for 
Gender (Woman) 0.581*** 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.949 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 0.918 
Dummy for White 
Non-Hispanic 1.134 
Dummy for Other 
Non-Hispanic 0.696 
Dummy for 
Hispanic Non-
White 0.915 
Dummy for 
Hispanic White 0.668 
Sample Size 6,479 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 2.16: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Dying for Black Male 
Population 
Total Lifespan Hazard Ratio 
Percent Covered 
Interacted with 
Black 0.703 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 0.234*** 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 0.374*** 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 0.466** 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 0.561* 
Log Income at 64 0.911 
Log Assets at 64 0.939 
Marriage at 64 0.695 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 1.367 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 1.342 
Sample Size 403 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 3. MEDICARE PART D AND FINANCIAL INSECURITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Medicare Part D was created by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, and 
rolled out in January 2006. This was the largest expansion of an entitlement program 
since Medicare itself. Rising drug costs for seniors due to medical advancement 
motivated the creation of Part D. Medicare Part D had an instant effect on drug coverage, 
increasing rates of prescription drug coverage among from around 75% to 90%. 
This large increase in drug coverage among seniors had a positive impact on 
health outcomes, decreasing seniors’ hospitalization rates (Afendulis et al. 2011), 
increasing medication adherence (Stuart et al. 2013, Jung et al. 2014, Donohue et al. 
2010, Zhang et al. 2010), and decreasing congestive heart failure rates (Dall et al. 2013). 
Finally, Dunn and Shapiro (2017) and Huh and Reif (2017) both find that Medicare Part 
D improved mortality at age 66. Overall, Part D helped improve the health of seniors. 
However, previous literature has yet to examine if Medicare Part D could have benefitted 
seniors’ financial stability. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of Medicare Part D on financial/food insecurity 
among elderly Americans. According to the AARP, approximately 9% of Americans 
over age 60 experience some form of food insecurity (Strickhouser et al. 2014). For black 
elderly, this reaches 24% and for Hispanic elderly, 20%. Food insecurity is also 
correlated with health problems, suggesting those who have high medical costs may 
struggle to afford food. In 1997, prior to Medicare Part D, approximately 8% to 16% of 
seniors have experienced food insecurity within a 6-month period (Wellman et al. 1997). 
Among the elderly, minorities are more likely to report financial difficulty acquiring food 
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(Klesges 2001). Previous research into health economics has found that when uninsured 
receive health insurance, this can allow them to switch expenditures previously spent on 
necessary health treatments to other important areas, such as food or debt repayment. The 
classic RAND health experiment found access to health insurance improved financial 
stability of the recipients by lowering medical debt. Health spending is often inelastic. 
Thus, even an individual whose health expenditures did not significantly change before 
or after receiving coverage might have benefited financially from health insurance, if 
they were able to switch spending from health to other important areas.  
My paper is the first to examine the impact of Medicare Part D on financial 
stability. Previous literature has focused almost exclusively on the health effects of 
Medicare Part D. In addition, this is the first paper to examine the impact of Part D on 
financial stability by race. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Medicare Part D, which led to near-universal drug coverage among senior citizens, 
would be expected to improve their overall finances by allowing them to shift money 
previously spent on drug expenditures to other areas. As a group, Americans age 65 and 
older have higher rates of poverty. Papers such as Basu et al. (2010) and Millet et al. 
(2010) found that Medicare Part D reduced senior citizen’s out-of-pocket drug 
expenditures. Presumably savings on health costs could be shifted to other areas. Lee 
(2013) describes how obtaining health insurance can impact food insecurity both directly 
and indirectly: directly through reduced healthcare costs and indirectly because those 
who are ill may not be able to work. 
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Looking at the relationship between food insecurity and cost-related medication 
nonadherence, Bengle et al. (2010) finds food-insecure older Americans are three times 
as likely to also report not purchasing medication for financial reasons. Adults with 
chronic diseases such as diabetes are more likely to also report food insufficiency 
(Nelson et al. 2001, Seligman et al. 2010). Public insurance, chronic illnesses, and 
minority status are all associated with both cost-related medication underuse and food 
insecurity (Berkowitz 2014). Bhargava et al. (2012) also finds food-insecure elderly are 
more likely to underutilize healthcare. Not surprisingly, there appears to be a tradeoff in 
spending between health and food. Neilsen et al. (2010) finds the probability of hunger 
for U.S. families increased when out-of-pocket medical expenditures increased. 
Interestingly, food security did not affect medical spending, indicating the latter to be 
more inelastic. Kersey et al. (1999) found emergency department patients had high rates 
of hunger. They reported making choices between buying food or medicine, and loss of 
food stamps was associated with not being able to afford medicine and self-reported 
worse health. The creation of Medicare did lower poverty rates among senior citizens. In 
fact, the near-elderly, those 60-65 who cannot yet access Medicare, tend to have higher 
rates of food insufficiency than older Americans (Rowley 2012).  
I would expect any improvements in financial stability as a result of Part D to 
show up among lower-income elderly. Since demand for food and healthcare are both 
relatively inelastic, only those without money to afford both would experience a trade-
off. Klein, Turvey, and Wallace (2004) find that the elderly most likely to delay 
prescription medication as a result of cost are: those with Medicare coverage only, low 
income, poor health, African-American race, and age 65–80. Gellad, Haas, and Safran 
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(2003) likewise report that blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to not take 
medication for cost-related reasons. Saver et al. (2004) also finds that low-income 
Americans are more likely to have difficulty affording medications. 
Overall, it seems that little research has been done into the indirect effects of 
Medicare Part D on the finances and food security of the elderly, making this a rich field 
for research. 
Despite improvements in health and coverage as a result of Medicare Part D, 
Chapter 1 found that gains were not as large among minorities and those with lower 
incomes. Seniors reported the enrollment process to be confusing, and it could be more 
difficult for those in a lower income bracket. There is ample evidence that Medicare 
beneficiaries do not always choose the best possible Part D plan. Anecdotally, the many 
different Part D plans are difficult to understand and their benefits change every year, 
making it hard for seniors to consistently stay in the best possible plan. Abaluck and 
Gruber (2011), Ericson (2014), and Zhou and Zhang (2012) all find losses in patient 
welfare due to seniors choosing more expensive plans less-suited to their needs. 
The creation of Medicare Part D in 2006 was inspired by concerns over lack of 
access to medication among the elderly population. According to Soumerai et al. (2006), 
prior to Part D, rates of medication non-adherence due to prohibitive costs were highest 
among those with disabilities, poor health, multiple morbidities, and limited drug 
coverage. In total, among Medicare enrollees, 29% of the disabled and 13% of the elderly 
beneficiaries report not taking prescribed medications due to cost. Those who restrict 
their medications due to cost have worst self-reported health and higher rates of angina, 
nonfatal heart attacks, and strokes (Heisler et al. 2004). 
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Medication nonadherence is a serious issue in U.S. healthcare, estimated to cost 
about $396 to $792 million per year as a result of additional healthcare utilization 
(Munger et al. 2007). Looking across thirty-nine articles, Lacro et al. (2002) find that the 
factors most associated with medication nonadherence are “poor insight, negative attitude 
or subjective response toward medication, previous nonadherence, substance abuse, 
shorter illness duration, inadequate discharge planning or aftercare environment, and 
poorer therapeutic alliance.” Seniors with lower incomes might be more at-risk for 
factors such as substance abuse or negative attitudes towards healthcare providers. 
Munger et al. 2007 find that elderly patients and women are more likely to exhibit 
medication nonadherence for antihypertensive medication. In addition, African-American 
and Hispanic patients are more likely to not take their prescribed medication, even 
controlling for socioeconomic status, health insurance coverage, health status, and health 
risk behaviors. Munger et al. 2007 attribute the difference to language proficiency, 
cultural beliefs, and attitudes toward healthcare. Medication nonadherence leads to a 
broad range of adverse outcomes, including cardiovascular hospitalization and 
revascularization procedures (Ho et al. 2008). 
Madden et al. (2009) was the first study to use longitudinal data to examine 
changes in cost-related medication nonadherence after Medicare Part D. Their paper also 
looked at look at spending on basic needs (e.g., food) using the Medicare Current 
Beneficiary Survey. Changes in the dependent variables between 2005 and 2006 (before 
and after Medicare Part D implementation) were compared with changes between 2004 
and 2005. Madden et al. used full population analyses to avoid selection biases due to 
greater Part D enrollment among sicker and poorer beneficiaries. 
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Using odds ratios of cost-related medication nonadherence (CRN) and basic 
needs, Madden et al. (2009) found significant decreases in the odds of CRN and increases 
in spending on basic needs after Medicare Part D. Examining subgroups, they also found 
significant decreases in CRN among lower-income beneficiaries. Overall, the 
implementation of Part D was associated with modest but significant decreases in the 
prevalence of CRN. In absolute terms, prevalence of CRN decreased by 2.6 percentage 
points, and spending less on basic needs by 3.5 percentage points. This suggests that 
Medicare Part D did loosen constraints on finances for seniors, leading to more spending 
on basic needs. 
In 2011, nearly one in every seven Americas, or forty-seven million people, are 
enrolled in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). This number has 
risen over time due to the Great Recession and the 2002 and 2008 Farm Acts. The United 
States differs from many first-world countries in relying on food stamps instead of cash 
transfers to feed impoverished families (Poppendieck 2014). However, the impact of food 
stamps on food insecurity can be difficult to calculate due to the tendency of recipients to 
shift spending previously spent on food into other categories (Gibson‐Davis and Foster 
2006, Yen et al. 2008). In addition, more needy households select into SNAP (Gregory et 
al. 2013). Nord and Golla (2009) circumvent this issue by examining the same 
households before and after receiving SNAP benefits, and find about a one-third 
reduction in the prevalence of food insecurity. Similarly, Ratcliffe et al. (2011) find that 
receiving SNAP benefits reduces the likelihood of being food insecure by roughly 30% 
and the likelihood of being very food insecure by 20%. Comparing to low-income 
households with incomes slightly above SNAP eligibility, Nord and Prell (2011) find that 
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the SNAP expansions of 2008-2009 decreased food insecurity by 2.2 percentage points. 
Recent papers with new methodologies have found that SNAP decreases food insecurity, 
but previously researchers frequently found that SNAP benefits were associated with 
greater food insecurity due to selection bias issues; looking at means, SNAP eligibility 
tends to be correlated with hunger (Gregory et al. 2013). For this reason, I use caution in 
my interpretation of my summary statistics. 
 
3.2.1 Differential Impact by Demographic Factors 
One of the focuses of Chapter 3 is to examine if the impact of Medicare Part D on 
financial stability differed by race and gender. My findings in Chapter 2 and Levy and 
Weir (2010) suggest that after Part D, coverage increased for all groups, erasing the 
differential between the most advantaged and less-advantaged groups. However, because 
of higher rates of Medicaid drug coverage among the poor and minorities, these groups 
were more likely than non-Hispanic whites to have coverage before Part D, so their gains 
were relatively smaller. Other studies including Maciejewski et al. (2010) also support 
that take-up rates were lower among black and Hispanic seniors and those with lower 
incomes. Still, Medicare Part D increased prescription drug coverage, spending, and 
utilization for all groups. Despite lower take-up rates, black seniors may have 
experienced greater increases in their quality of prescription drug coverage. After Part D, 
9% of black seniors switched from Medicaid coverage to Part D plans.58 Theoretically, 
                                                 
58 As discussed in Chapter 1, although Medicaid offers drug coverage, the quality varies wildly across 
states. Many states which limit seniors to generic drugs with higher copays for drugs on their non-approved 
list. States with more stringent Medicaid eligibility and limits on number of prescriptions filled per month 
also had higher rates of cost-related medication skipping (Safran et al. 2002). Prior to Part D, Cunningham 
(2005) found that a fifth of all Medicaid enrollees reported trouble paying for their prescription drugs. In 
addition, Miller et al. (2008) found that 10% of Medicaid enrollees reported spending more than 10% of 
their income on healthcare, and this was driven by prescription drug costs. 
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obtaining superior prescription drug insurance through Medicare Part D instead of 
Medicaid might allow beneficiaries who previously struggled to pay for life-saving drugs 
to become more financially stable overall. This could allow seniors to shift spending into 
food and debt. 
 
3.2.2 Contribution 
My contribution to the literature is to look at Medicare Part D’s impact on food 
insecurity and financial stability. Previous papers have focused on the health effects of 
Part D, ranging from medication utilization and spending to various health conditions. 
This is the first paper to look at whether obtaining health insurance allowed seniors to 
shift spending into food or debt over the long-run. Madden et al. (2009) examined 
changes in cost-related medication nonadherence and basic needs shortly after Medicare 
Part D, but their analysis was limited in scope due to their most recent data being 
available in 2008, directly after Part D was created in 2006. It would be worthwhile to 
analyze if the spillover effects might have been stronger the longer Part D was in effect. 
Also, Madden et al. (2009) only had the data to look at one category of basic needs 
spending, whereas I look at food insecurity and household debt separately. 
My sample contains data from 1996 to 2014. In addition, the Health and 
Retirement Survey has detailed information on demographics, allowing me to analyze 
how the impact of Part D differed by race and gender. 
Chapter 1 looked at the take-up rates of Part D by race, and found similar 
coverage rates across all groups after 2006. One of the largest differences between white 
and black seniors was that three times as many black seniors moved from Medicaid to 
Part D. In Chapter 2, I found a positive impact on life expectancy for black male seniors 
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but not for the entire population. My findings in Chapter 1 suggested that one of the 
mechanisms may have been an improvement in quality of drug coverage for black men 
who moved out of Medicaid into Part D plans. By examining the impact of Part D by 
race, I hope to test whether there is a greater decline in cost-related medication non-
adherence for black men, which would provide evidence that quality of coverage 
improved more for this group. 
3.3 Data 
I use the Health and Retirement Study Panel core files from 1996 to 2014 to 
examine the impact of Medicare Part D on financial insecurity for seniors.59 I examine 
several measures of financial stability, including cost-related medication nonadherence, 
debt, and food insecurity. I compare these before and after the rollout of Medicare Part D, 
using odds ratios in a manner similar to Madden et al. (2009) and risk ratios using a Cox 
Proportional Hazards Model. The purpose of this approach is to estimate the change in 
financial outcomes after Part D, controlling for historical year-to-year changes and using 
the total population to avoid selection bias due to those in worst health being more likely 
to take up Part D. 
The HRS sample size is approximately 20,000, with response rates consistently 
between 80 and 90 percent. As in Chapter 2, I dropped individuals from my sample with 
missing birth year or without data at age 64. Next, I dropped those individuals who were 
too young to have lived to at least age 73 in 2014, since my goal is to examine probability 
of an adverse event occurring between ages 65 to 73. 
                                                 
59 Here “elderly” is defined as age 65 and older. 
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3.3.1 Identification 
My dependent variables are cost-related medication nonadherence, food 
insecurity, and household debt. My key independent variable is percent of time 
potentially covered by Part D from ages 65 to 73. I do not use which seniors took up 
Medicare Part D as my key independent variable because of the selection bias issue. Levy 
and Weir (2010) find that seniors who were healthy and who didn’t use prescription 
drugs were less likely to take up drug insurance after the expansion. Because Medicare 
Part D offered close to universal coverage to seniors, I use eligibility for Part D rather 
than who actually took it up as my independent variable. Similarly to Madden et al. 
(2009), I analyze the total population of U.S. seniors to find the effects of Part D. I do not 
want to use seniors who did not take up Part D because they did not use drugs as a 
control group. 
As in Chapter 2, I create my key independent variable based on percent of time 
ages 65 to 73 an individual was eligible for Part D, because I can collect data at age 73 
for my entire sample. Those who turned 65 in 2006 were covered the entire period, all 8 
years, until they reached 73. Those who turned 73 in 2006 were covered zero years from 
65 to 73, and so forth. This leaves seven groups with partial coverage by Medicare Part D 
in between, or nine categories total for percent of time age 65-73 an individual could 
have taken up Medicare Part D if they desired (and assuming they lived until 73).60 The 
                                                 
60 This variable also captures increases in generosity in Part D over time, which seniors born later would 
have benefitted more from. 
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sign and significance of “Percent Covered” tests whether or not Part D had an impact on 
cost-related medication nonadherence, food insecurity, and debt among seniors.  
3.3.2 Generating Variables 
Health status, marriage, income and assets are all collected at age 64.61 Income 
represents the sum of all income in a household.62 Assets represents the net value of total 
wealth in a household. Both have been log transformed because of their highly positive 
skew. My race categories are White63, Black Non-Hispanic, Other Non-Hispanic, and 
Hispanic Non-White. Education has eight categories, but for the sake of space only four-
year college degree and high school degree is included in my tables.64 I considered 
including a variable for whether or not a respondent was alive during the recession,65 but 
did not because 93% of my sample was alive during the recession. The Great Recession 
could possibly have a downward bias on my results, making the impact of Part D seem 
smaller. 
3.4 Summary Statistics 
There are two yes/no questions in the HRS which address food insecurity: “Did 
you (or other family members who were living here) receive government food stamps at 
any time in the last two years?” and “In the last two years, have you always had enough 
money to buy the food you need?” For cost-related medication nonadherence, the HRS 
                                                 
61 For those who answered the survey at an odd year of age, I rounded up. For these individuals, the data 
categories at age 64 were taken at age 65 instead. 
62 Only including respondent and spouse, divided by two for couples so it’s consistent for those not 
married. 
63 Which includes both white non-Hispanic and White Hispanic. 
64 The education categories are no degree, GED, high school diploma, two year college degree, four year 
college degree, master degree, professional degree, and degree unknown/some college. 
65 Year fixed effects could not be used in non-panel data. 
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asks: “At any time in the last two years have you ended up taking less medication than 
was prescribed for you because of the cost?” For my summary statistics, I examine how 
the answers to these questions compare before and after Medicare Part D. The question 
on cost-related medication nonadherence was only asked from 2002 onward, so data is 
not available in earlier years. 
Because the HRS’s survey questions ask about “the last two years,” I would 
expect the full impact of Medicare Part D to show up in 2008, two years after the 
program was created. (Some effect of prescription drug coverage might still show up in 
2006, so the most accurate before-after comparison would be 2004 to 2008.) Figures 3.1, 
3.2, and 3.3 show unadjusted prevalence rates for cost-related medication nonadherence, 
usage of food stamps, and food insecurity, with bars to represent the 95% confidence 
interval. This methodology is the same as that used in Madden et al. (2009) in order to 
examine the impact of Part D on basic needs spending.66 
Looking at unadjusted prevalence rates, I find that 7.2% of seniors reported cost-
related medication nonadherence in 2006.67 In 2008, after Medicare Part D took effect 
over the last two years, this fell to 6.2%. The difference was large enough to be (barely) 
outside the 95% confidence interval of the previous year. The rates fluctuated from 2002-
201468 between six to seven percent, though on average remaining lower than the average 
before Part D. Note that prior to Medicare Part D, cost-related medication nonadherence 
was rising, indicating that the decrease made by Medicare Part D might be understated in 
my summary statistics because there was previously a trend pushing the numbers upward. 
                                                 
66 The HRS is replenished with younger seniors over time, so overall aging of the sample is not a concern. 
However, these summary statistics could be influenced by economic conditions over time. 
67 In other words, these seniors took less medication than prescribed sometime in the last two years. 
68 The question about cost-related medication nonadherence was first added to the HRS in 2002. 
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Overall, Figure 3.1 suggests that Medicare Part D decreased the number of seniors who 
did not take prescribed medication for financial reasons, which would be an expected 
consequence of expanding access to prescription drug insurance. 
Figure 3.2 looks at whether the respondent or any family member received food 
stamps in the last two years (aka since the previous wave). Here, it is not clear what the 
effect of Part D was. The percent of elderly respondents who used SNAP increased from 
2004 to 2008 from 4.4% to 5.2%. This change is small enough to almost be within the 
95% confidence interval. We would expect Medicare Part D to improve the finances of 
seniors and thus decrease enrollment for food stamps, the opposite of my finding. 
However, other factors impacted SNAP during this time period. First, the Farm Bill of 
2002 (aka the Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002) reauthorized the food 
stamp program. This expanded eligibility by adjusting the standard deduction to vary by 
household size and be indexed for inflation; providing states with options to simplify the 
program; and eliminating the cost neutrality requirement for electronic benefit transfer 
systems. According to the USDA, “Food stamp participation increased from about 17.2 
million in fiscal year 2000 to 26 million people in July 2006.” This impact is clearly seen 
in Figure 3.2, showing an increase in food stamp usage leading up to 2006. Similarly, the 
Farm Bill of 2008 also expanded the food stamp program, changing its name to SNAP 
and expanding eligibility. Finally, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
increased SNAP benefit levels and expanded SNAP eligibility for jobless adults without 
children. Seniors in particular would likely be affected due to higher rates of poverty 
among the elderly. Once again, Figure 3.2 shows a sharp increase in usage of food stamps 
after this new law. However, this change shouldn’t necessarily be taken as an increase in 
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hunger, since it could have been driven by changes in eligibility for the program. For this 
reason, it is difficult to use my summary statistics to look at the impact of Medicare Part 
D on food stamps, because too many other changes in SNAP occurred around this time 
period. 
In Figure 3.3, I examined the question “In the last two years, have you always had 
enough money to buy the food you need?” Seniors who did not always have enough 
money to buy food rose from 3.9% in 2002 to 5.4% in 2004. Then it dropped to 4.5% in 
2006, going back to 5.2% in 2008. There is some indication here that food insecurity was 
increasing before Part D and that the program may have halted or at least decreased the 
magnitude of the increase. However, food insecurity fluctuated over the period from 
1996-2014, and the changes around 2006 were no greater than unexplained changes in 
other years.69 Once again, it is difficult to separate what the impact of the changes in food 
stamp eligibility during this time period might have been from a possible, likely lesser, 
impact from Medicare Part D. A more telling measure will be to actually look at risk 
ratios before and after Part D. 
Finally, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 look at the trends in cost-related medication 
nonadherence and food security for black seniors. I find that black seniors had rates of 
cost-related medication nonadherence around 9-11%, about 5 percentage points higher 
than for the total population of seniors. There was no difference in the trends over time: 
for both groups, cost-related medication nonadherence decreased after 2006. In Figure 
3.5, black seniors reported rates of food insecurity around 10-16%, about 6-7 percentage 
                                                 
69 My sample sizes were from 10,000-14,000 per year, tending to increase over time. The exception was 
1996, where sample sizes were around 1,000. This year also shows greater fluctuations likely due to the 
smaller sample size. 
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points higher than the total population of seniors. Again, I see no difference in trends for 
black seniors, who also had increasing rates of food insecurity starting before Part D. 
I compare my results to the trends in food insecurity found by the USDA’s 
Economic Research Service (Figure 3.6). For the total U.S. population, food insecurity 
rates among households increased pre-Part D from 10.5% in 2000 to 12.0% in 2004. 
After a slight dip from 2005-2007, percent of food insecure households increased in 2008 
up to 14.6, and declined to 14.0% in 2014, a downward trend which has been continuing 
in the most recent data. 
Looking at food insecurity rates among the elderly, I turn to data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), compiled by Ziliak and Gundersen (2018). Figure 3.7 shows 
trends in food insecurity for Americans ages 60 and older, examining separately marginal 
food insecurity, food insecurity, and very low food security.70 These measures are created 
based on eighteen questions asking about difficulty affording food in the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS), where marginal food insecurity is defined as one or more affirmative 
responses, food insecurity is defined as three or more affirmative responses, and very low 
food security is defined as eight or more affirmative responses in households with 
children or six or more affirmative responses in households without. In 2016, Ziliak and 
Gundersen (2018) found that 13.6% of those over age 60 were marginally food insecure 
(8.6 million seniors), 7.7% were food insecure (4.9 million seniors), and 2.9% were very 
low food secure (1.8 million seniors). They find higher rates of food insecurity than my 
own summary statistics, which found rates around 5%. There are two possible reasons. 
First, Ziliak and Gundersen (2018) looked at Americans over age 60 and I looked at those 
                                                 
70 This figure was taken from Ziliak and Gundersen (2018) with permission from the authors. 
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over age 65, and they find that younger seniors are more likely to report food insecurity. 
Secondly, I rely on only one question in the HRS to calculate food insecurity whereas 
they use eighteen questions in the Food Security Supplement.  
Figure 3.7 shows trends in food insecurity over time for Americans over age 60, 
both as a percent of households and in millions of seniors. Ziliak and Gundersen (2018) 
show that across all three measures, food insecurity has been increasing since 2001 (a 
45% increase in food insecurity from 2001 to 2016). The number of food insecure seniors 
rose by 113%, although this also reflects increases in the population of seniors. From 
2014 to 2016, there has been a slight decline in food insecurity. Ziliak and Gundersen 
(2018) report the highest food insecurity rates among seniors living in states in the South 
and Southwest, seniors with lower incomes, seniors aged 60-69, black seniors, and 
Hispanic seniors. Compared to my own summary statistics in the HRS, I also find that 
food insecurity has been increasing over time. My findings show more variation across 
years and less statistical significance, which may reflect smaller sample sizes. As a result 
of increasing food insecurity rates among seniors over the last decade, my findings could 
possible underestimate the impact of Part D, if Part D helped curb an existing trend of 
rising food insecurity. 
Next, I focus on debt. The HRS asks if a household had any debt and amount of 
household debt. I find that probability of having any debt among seniors rose steadily 
over time from 1996-2014. There’s no evidence of a decline post-2006. Looking at 
amount of household debt, again debt has been increasing over time, and this trend did 
not appear to change after Medicare Part D. For debt at age 73 in particular, 72% of 
seniors reported having no debt. The smallest amount of household debt was $1 and the 
108 
 
greatest was $2 million. Among those seniors who reported debt at age 73, the average 
amount was $48,000 and the median was $2,000. 
Overall, my summary statistics find some evidence of Medicare Part D reducing 
the number of respondents who did not take medication for monetary reasons. However, I 
do not find any evidence of it impacting food security or debt. Food security and debt 
could potentially be influenced by many other factors, so it is difficult to predict the 
effect of Part D from looking at summary statistics. 
3.5 Theoretical Predictions 
Previous literature found that Medicare Part D decreased seniors’ out-of-pocket 
spending on drugs (Basu et al. 2010 and Millet et al. 2010). Thus, my hypothesis is that 
Medicare Part D, which led to a 15% increase in drug coverage among seniors, would 
allow seniors to increase their spending in other essential areas such as housing, food, and 
debt. In addition, I expect Medicare Part D to have a stronger impact on those 
demographic groups with the most need for health/drug insurance. Prior to Part D, the 
black population of seniors was more likely to have drug coverage through sources like 
Medicaid or “other” coverage, which required more spending out-of-pocket (as discussed 
in the literature above). Thus, I test whether these groups could have experienced a 
greater effect from Part D. 
3.6 Results 
First, I compare odds ratios before and after the rollout of Medicare Part D. I 
examine the mean rate of medication nonadherence and financial/food insecurity incurred 
by seniors to determine the incremental difference attributable to access to prescription 
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drug insurance. Then I analyze the hazard rates for experiencing medication 
nonadherence, food insecurity, and debt using a Cox Proportional Hazards Model. 
My results in Figure 3.8 show the ratio of odds ratios for the categories described 
above. I compare 2002-2004 to 2006-2008 because the HRS asks about CRN/food 
insecurity every two years, so the impact of Medicare Part D would not show up in full 
until 2008. For cost-related medication nonadherence, the ratio of odds ratios before and 
after Medicare Part D was 0.84. Therefore, between the periods of 2002-2004 and 2006-
2008 there was a significant decrease in the number of elderly respondents who reported 
failing to take medication due to financial constraints. Next, comparing 2002-2004 to 
2012-2014, the ratio of odds ratios was 0.79, an even greater decline. It’s possible that the 
2007 recession caused the improvement in seniors taking medications due to Part D to be 
smaller in earlier years. Thus my calculations for 2012-2014 would reflect more of the 
true improvements due to Medicare Part D. 
The ratio of odds ratios for usage of food stamps from 2002-2004 to 2006-2008 
was 0.53, indicating an increase in food stamp usage. This is the opposite of what I would 
expect, although as mentioned in the last section, it is difficult to separate out the impact 
of Medicare Part D from several reforms of SNAP carried out during this time period.71 
In order to avoid this issue, next I looked at the ratio of odds ratios for usage of food 
stamps from 2004-2006 to 2006-2008. By starting my analysis two years later, I intended 
to compare odds ratios from only time periods after the SNAP expansion. I found 0.63, 
which still indicates an increase in food stamp usage. This suggests the increase in food 
stamp usage over time can also partly be attributed to pre-existing trends. 
                                                 
71 Cost-Related Medication Adherence, discussed above, would both be more likely to be influence by Part 
D and less likely to be influence by SNAP expansions. 
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By 2012-2014, the ratio of odds ratios was 0.37, indicating an even greater 
increase in food stamp usage. Both the Great Recession and increases in SNAP eligibility 
could lead to more seniors using food stamps. 
For food insecurity, the ratio of odds ratios was 1.05 for comparting 2002-2004 to 
2006-2008 and 1.03 for 2012-2014, finding little change over time at all. For amount of 
household debt, the odds ratios were 0.83 and 0.54 respectively, suggesting an increase in 
debt over time, the opposite of the hypothetical impact of Medicare Part D. Part D clearly 
did not decrease food insecurity or household debt in the aggregate as these show trends 
of increasing over time. It remains to be seen if Part D affected the hazard rates. 
Overall, my results are similar to my summary statistics: I find clear evidence that 
Medicare Part D improved cost-related medication nonadherence, but it is more difficult 
to find an impact on food security or financial security.  
Next, I examine risk ratios, using a Cox Proportional Hazards Model and 
adjusting for various demographic categories (Table 3.1). I estimate the hazard ratio for 
medication non-adherence, food insecurity, and household debt, adjusting for risk factors 
such as age, race, sex, income, and assets. 
Using a Cox Proportional Hazards Model allows me to examine the incidence or 
hazard rate of an adverse event occurring—in other words, the number of new cases per 
population per unit of time. The hazard function represents the probability that if an 
individual survives to time t, they will experience the adverse event. In contrast, a logistic 
regression would consider proportion of new cases that develop in a given time period, 
i.e. the cumulative incidence. A logistic regression estimates the odds ratio and a Cox 
Proportional Hazards Model estimates the hazard ratio. As shown in my summary 
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statistics, food stamp usage and debt among seniors is increasing over time, likely 
influenced by the Great Recession.72 By looking instead at hazard rates of experiencing 
food insecurity and debt, this allows me to examine how Part D impacted the probability 
of a new adverse event occurring instead of total frequency of such events, which better 
allows me to separate out the effects of SNAP expansions and the recession. Variables on 
income and assets also help capture SNAP eligibility. Although the recession may still 
have some effect on my results, if anything it would lead me to underestimate the benefits 
of Part D for seniors.  
Finally, there is a censoring issue due members of my sample dying, another 
reason to use survival analysis. The Cox Proportional Hazards Model includes an 
indicator variable if the observation is terminated by death and a likelihood function for 
censored data, in order to handle the random censoring problem of seniors leaving the 
sample due to mortality. 
For my first Cox Proportional Hazards Model, the failure event is any instance of 
respondent failing to take medication for the reason of not having enough money from 
ages 65 to 73. I compare this to the percent of time age 65 to 73 an individual was 
potentially covered by Part D. Since the failure event is cost-related medication 
nonadherence, a hazard ratio of less than one implies the variable led to a decrease in 
cost-related medication nonadherence.73 
                                                 
72 Figure 3.8 shows the ratio of odds ratios. The increase in food stamp usage and debt over this time 
period is likely driven by SNAP expansions and the Great Recession. It would be difficult to separate out 
the impact of this macroeconomic event using a logistic regression, which uses odd ratios. This is a reason 
to instead use a Cox Proportional Hazards Model. 
73 I also tested using a shared frailty model to account for similarities between seniors who shared a 
household. Respondents might be more likely to report cost-related medication nonadherence if another 
respondent from the same household reported cost-related medication nonadherence. However, I found this 
did not affect my results. The same was also true for probability of reporting food insecurity and household 
debt. 
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I control for various demographic factors: self-reported health, log of income, log 
of assets, marriage, gender, education, and race. These variables were all reported at age 
64-65. My variable of interest is the exposure of the respondent to Medicare Part D, 
captured by the variable Percent Covered. I interpret “Percent Covered,” my independent 
variable of interest in the regressions, as being the percent of time that age 65-73 that an 
individual had Medicare Part D as an option (assuming they lived for the 8 years). As 
previously mentioned, healthy seniors selected out of drug coverage, so instead whether 
seniors had access to Medicare Part D, which offered universal coverage, is a more 
accurate reflection of accessibility of care to use as an independent variable. My 
dependent variable, cost-related medication nonadherence, represents whether a senior 
did not take prescribed medicine due to not being able to afford it from ages 65 to 73. 
Hence, I’m testing the impact of percent of time potentially covered by Part D ages 65-73 
on risk of cost-related medication nonadherence from ages 65-73. 
I find that Medicare Part D led to a decrease in cost-related medication 
nonadherence on the order of a 21% decrease for an additional 8 years of Medicare Part 
D coverage, significant at the 1% level (Table 3.1).74 It is intuitive that Part D, a program 
offering prescription drug insurance, should reduce the number of seniors who failed to 
take prescribed medicine because they could not afford it. 
Being in worst possible health made it less likely someone would not take 
medication. The sign of this coefficient could be rationalized either direction; on the one 
hand, people in worst health tend to be poorer so they would be more likely to skip 
medication, but on the other hand, people in worst health might have a very inelastic 
                                                 
74 The question on cost-related medication nonadherence was first asked in 2002, making my sample size 
smaller for Table 3.1 than in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
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demand for medication since not taking it could be fatal. My regression points to the 
latter case. Being white and female both decreased cost-related medication nonadherence, 
whereas being black or Hispanic increased it. Education, income and assets proved 
insignificant, although a 4-year college degree decreased cost-related medication 
nonadherence at the 10% level. 
Focusing on black men in particular, Medicare Part D had an even strong effect: a 
30% decrease in probability of cost-related medication nonadherence for an additional 8 
years of potential Part D coverage, significant at the 5% level.75 I expected that Part D 
might have a greater impact for populations who previously had less access to 
prescription drugs. As mentioned in my literature review, the effect for the black 
population may have been at least partially driven by movement from Medicaid to 
Medicare Part D, which offered more comprehensive drug coverage, making enrollees 
less likely to need to skip medications. My other independent variables are similar to the 
whole population, with assets, education, and being in worse health all decreasing the 
probability of failing to take medication. 
Next, I examine the Hispanic population. Here, I find a 20% decrease in the 
probability of cost-related medication nonadherence from ages 65 to 73 for an additional 
8 years of Medicare Part D coverage. However, this effect was not significant.76 Overall, 
Part D improved cost-related medication nonadherence for the whole population, with a 
greater impact for minorities. 
                                                 
75 Black women show little difference from the total population, hence why black men were picked for 
Table 3.1. 
76 The Hispanic population of seniors was too small to separate into males and females. The small sample 
size also led to lower significance levels and several variables being eliminated. 
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In Table 3.2, I look at the impact of Medicare Part D on probability of being food 
insecure. The dependent variable for food insecure equals one if an individual reported 
being food insecure in one survey year between ages 65 to 73. Hence, I compare percent 
of time eligible for Part D from ages 65 to 73 to probability of being food insecure from 
ages 65 to 73. I find that Medicare Part D led to a 3% decrease in food insecurity for an 
additional 8 years of Medicare Part D coverage, although this was not significant. The 
other independent variables remained similar to last regression, with the exception that 
being in worst health increased the probability of being food insecure. In addition, I 
found an even stronger effect on the black male population, a 7% decrease in probability 
of reporting food insecurity for an additional 8 years of Medicare Part D coverage. This 
was also insignificant. The greatest impact is for the Hispanic population, with a 14% 
decrease in food insecurity for an additional 8 years of Medicare Part D coverage, also 
insignificant. Although my significance levels are low, these results suggest that Part D 
coverage could have improved food security among seniors, with an even stronger affect 
for those demographic groups who previously had higher out-of-pocket costs for drugs.77  
Compared to my odds ratios, my hazard ratios are less affected by the changes in 
SNAP eligibility because I’m able to separate out numerous independent variables (such 
as income and assets) which would affect eligibility for food stamps. Also, if changes in 
                                                 
77 In addition, I also looked at the impact of Medicare Part D on the probability of reporting food insecurity 
from ages 65-73 for two years, for three years, and so forth. (The Cox Proportional Hazard Model only 
allows for binary failure events, hence why I looked at multiple food insecurities separately.) I consistently 
found that Medicare Part D increased the probability of being food insecure by about 2-5%. There was no 
evidence that the effect was larger or smaller based on how many times being food insecure occurred. (In 
other words, Part D did not affect those who were more frequently food insecure more or less). Those who 
reported food insecurity five or more times were not frequent enough in number to estimate their hazard 
rates. Consistently, the black and Hispanic population experienced a greater effect, ranging from 3-30%. A 
final option would be to examine the impact of food insecurity in a panel data set using a shared frailty 
model to account for correlation between the same respondent across years. However, I found there was not 
enough variation in my failure event using this methodology for the model to run successfully. 
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SNAP or the Great Recession were affecting my results, then I would expect to see food 
insecurity increasing instead of declining, as shown in Figures 3.6-3.8. If anything, this 
could make the effect of Part D seem smaller in Table 3.2 than it actually is. Because my 
summary statistics show food insecurity increasing rather than declining over time, this 
suggests that my estimate of a 3% decrease in food insecurity among all seniors for an 
additional 8 years of Medicare Part D coverage may be a lower bound and the true effect 
may be even larger. In addition, my key independent variable, Percent Covered, is a 
cohort effect not a time effect, making it less affected by policy changes in particular 
years. Finally, in order to test if my results were affected by general trends over time, I 
conduct a placebo test in my robustness checks below. 
Looking at the impact of Medicare Part D on household debt (Table 3.3), I use 
presence of household debt at age 73.78 I find that Medicare Part D led to a decrease in 
household debt on the order of a 9% decrease for an additional 8 years of Medicare Part 
D coverage, significant at the 15% level. In addition, I found an even stronger effect on 
the black population, a 12% decrease in debt for an additional 8 years of Medicare Part D 
coverage.79 This effect was insignificant, so I hesitate to draw strong conclusions. These 
results are suggestive that Part D reduced household debt. 
3.7 Robustness Checks 
Because my key independent variable, Percent Covered, was created using birth 
year, it could potentially capture any other cohort effects which might impact cost-related 
                                                 
78 For those deceased, I look at debt in the last year alive. 
79 Here, I look at the whole black population because black women actually saw a slightly larger effect 
instead of the impact being driven entirely by black men as in the previous two tables. Also, looking at the 
total black population increases my sample size—debt had more missing data. For the same reason, I do not 
have a large enough sample size to examine the Hispanic population. 
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medication nonadherence, food insecurity, and household debt. Trends in these variables 
over time could influence my results, including the recession and changes in SNAP 
eligibility as discussed above. 
In order to test the robustness of my findings, I ran a placebo test. My dependent 
variable was a new version of Percent Covered created as if Medicare Part D rolled out in 
1997 instead of 2006. This allowed me to test if trends over time could potentially be 
influencing my results in Tables 3.1-3.3. I was only able to run this regression on food 
insecurity and household debt, because the question on cost-related medication 
nonadherence was first created in 2002. 
As shown in Table 3.4, my fake Medicare Part D coverage actually increased the 
probability of food insecurity. This implies food insecurity among seniors may have been 
increasing over time prior to Part D. Hence, my findings in Table 3.2 (that Medicare Part 
D reduced food insecurity) could underestimate the true impact of Part D. Furthermore, 
this suggests that changes over time should not be a problem for this set of results.  
However, I find that the fake Medicare Part D decreased probability of household 
debt, which suggests a trend of debt decreasing for birth year cohorts over time. (In fact, 
the impact of the fake Medicare Part D was greater than the true Medicare Part D). 
Hence, I cannot say if my results in Table 3.3 are due to Medicare Part D or overall 
trends in time. Overall, the placebo test suggests that my results are robust for food 
insecurity, but not for household debt. 
Additionally, I tested the impact of Percent Covered on food insecurity using a 
logistic regression. However, here I found that percent of time eligible for Part D 
appeared to be increasing rather than decreasing food security. This is likely capturing the 
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trend of increasing food insecurity over time among seniors, as shown in my summary 
statistics. As discussed earlier, I used a Cox Proportional Hazards Model because it 
estimates the probability an individual does not experience an adverse event over a time 
period as opposed to a logistic regression which looks at the cumulative incidence of the 
adverse event, and thus a Cox Proportional Hazards Model would be more deft at 
separating out the impacts of trends in food insecurity over time. Thus, it is not 
completely surprising that the logistic regression had different results for the impact of 
Part D. However, since my results in my logistic regression do not support an impact of 
Part D on food insecurity, this robustness check failed. 
As a final robustness check, I examined the impact of Medicare Part D on 
probability of cost-related medication nonadherence for only those who took up Medicare 
Part D in 2006. Note that the selection bias issue could work in either direction for this 
sample, since those who took up Medicare Part D tended to have higher income/assets 
but also be in worse health and more likely to report prescription drug use. Here, the 
impact of Medicare Part D was even stronger (24% decrease for the total population and 
a 30% decrease for black men), providing additional evidence that Medicare Part D 
served its intended purpose in decreasing seniors who could not afford to take prescribed 
medicine. 
3.8 Conclusions 
Overall, I find evidence that Medicare Part D reduced cost-related medication 
nonadherence, with a greater impact for racial minorities. The strongest impact was on 
cost-related medication nonadherence. This suggests that Medicare Part D did fulfil its 
primary purpose by reducing the number of seniors who failed to take medication 
118 
 
because they could not afford them. In addition, I find a stronger impact for black men, 
which is also the group which experienced improvements in mortality in Chapter 2. 
Although my significance levels are low, I find some evidence that Medicare Part D may 
have had spillover positive effects by allowing seniors to shift out-of-pocket spending on 
medication to instead spending on food as a result of obtaining better health insurance. 
The impact was even stronger among minorities, with the greatest improvements for 
black men and Hispanic seniors. My results pass a placebo test for food insecurity, but 
not for household debt. I hesitate to draw strong conclusions because my findings on food 
insecurity were not significant and also did not appear robust in a logistic regression. In 
addition, it is difficult to separate the impact of SNAP expansions during this time period. 
However, this suggests a potential for further research into whether Medicare Part D had 
even greater benefits than previously realized, improving food security among seniors in 
addition to increasing access to life-saving medication. 
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Table 3.1: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Cost-related Medication 
Nonadherence 
 
Hazard 
Ratio—
Total Pop. 
Hazard 
Ratio—
Black Men 
Hazard 
Ratio—
Hispanic Pop. 
Percent Covered 0.787*** 0.702** 0.804 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 1.232*** 1.356 Omitted 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 1.114* 1.307 1.386* 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 0.930 1.050 1.433* 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 0.971 1.082 0.924 
Log Income at 64 1.017 0.984 0.655*** 
Log Assets at 64 1.001 0.941* 1.315*** 
Marriage at 64 1.100 1.591 Omitted 
Dummy for 
Gender (Woman) 0.907*** N/A 1.238 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.953 0.954 Omitted 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 0.874* 0.432*** Omitted 
Dummy for White 0.963 N/A N/A 
Dummy for Other 
Non-Hispanic 1.018 N/A N/A 
Dummy for 
Hispanic Non-
White 1.391*** N/A N/A 
Sample Size 1174 66 20 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Several variables in the regression on the Hispanic population are omitted due to small 
sample size 
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Table 3.2: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Food Insecurity 
 
Hazard 
Ratio—
Total Pop. 
Hazard 
Ratio—
Black Men 
Hazard 
Ratio—
Hispanic Pop. 
Percent Covered 0.974 0.934 0.865 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 0.812*** 0.448*** 0.796 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 0.824*** 0.549*** 0.715 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 0.850*** 0.460*** 0.737 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 0.884*** 0.491*** 0.961 
Log Income at 64 0.947*** 0.926** 1.066 
Log Assets at 64 0.970*** 0.968 0.965 
Marriage at 64 1.030 0.739 0.526** 
Dummy for 
Gender (Woman) 1.022 N/A Omitted 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.944*** 0.918 0.888 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 0.962 0.951 0.772 
Dummy for White 0.906*** N/A N/A 
Dummy for Other 
Non-Hispanic 1.014 N/A N/A 
Dummy for 
Hispanic Non-
White 0.875* N/A N/A 
Sample Size 6943 393 111 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 3.3: Impact of Part D Coverage on Hazard Rate for Household Debt 
 
Hazard 
Ratio—
Total Pop. 
Hazard 
Ratio—
Black Pop. 
Percent Covered 0.909 0.881 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 1.182 0.877 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 1.249* 1.098 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 1.138 0.985 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 1.130 1.034 
Log Income at 64 0.833*** 0.818*** 
Log Assets at 64 0.958** 0.973 
Marriage at 64 1.375*** 1.446* 
Dummy for 
Gender (Woman) 1.064 N/A 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.946 0.983 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 0.884 0.996 
Dummy for White 1.054 N/A 
Dummy for Other 
Non-Hispanic 0.974 N/A 
Dummy for 
Hispanic Non-
White 0.784 N/A 
Sample Size 1841 345 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Placebo Test on Total Population 
 Hazard Ratio—
Food Insecurity 
Hazard Ratio—
Household Debt 
Percent Covered 1.772*** 0.509*** 
Dummy for Best 
(Self-Reported) 
Health at 64 0.857*** 1.123 
Dummy for 
Second Best 
Health at 64 1.022 1.184 
Dummy for 
Medium Health 
at 64 0.970 1.085 
Dummy for 
Second Worst 
Health at 64 0.992 1.071 
Log Income at 64 1.040*** 0.828*** 
Log Assets at 64 0.982** 0.964** 
Marriage at 64 0.933*** 0.951 
Dummy for 
Gender (Woman) 0.987 1.070 
Dummy for High 
School Degree 0.962 0.939 
Dummy for 
College Degree 
(at least 4 years) 0.922** 0.859* 
Dummy for White 0.919*** 1.033 
Dummy for Other 
Non-Hispanic 1.058 0.979 
Dummy for 
Hispanic Non-
White 1.136 0.820 
Sample Size 6598 2089 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Figure 3.1: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Cost-related Medication Nonadherence (in 
Last Two Years) Among Seniors, 2002-2014 
 
Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
Sample Sizes: 10,000-12,000, varying by year 
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Figure 3.2: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Food Stamp Usage (in Last Two Years) 
Among Seniors, 1998-2014 
 
Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
Sample Sizes: 1,000-14,000, varying by year 
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Figure 3.3: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Food Insecurity (Did Not Have Enough 
Money to Buy Food in Last Two Years) Among Seniors, 1996-2014 
 
Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
Sample Sizes: 1,000-14,000, varying by year 
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Figure 3.4: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Cost-related Medication Nonadherence (in 
Last Two Years) Among Black Seniors, 2002-2014 
 
Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
Sample Sizes: 300-1,000 varying by year 
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Figure 3.5: Unadjusted Prevalence Rates of Food Insecurity (Did Not Have Enough 
Money to Buy Food in Last Two Years) Among Black Seniors, 1996-2014 
 
Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. No observations were available in 1996. 
Sample Sizes: 100-2,000 varying by year  
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Figure 3.6: Trends in Food Insecurity for Total U.S. Population 
 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service, using data from the Current Population 
Survey Food Security Supplement. Based on data published in Coleman-Jensen et al. 
(2018). 
Notes: Prevalence rates for 1996 and 1997 were adjusted for the estimated effects of 
differences in data collection screening protocols used in those years. Food-insecure 
households include those with low food security and very low food security. Food 
insecure is defined as “at times during the year, these households were uncertain of 
having, or unable to acquire, enough food to meet the needs of all their members because 
they had insufficient money or other resources for food”; low food security is defined as 
“these food-insecure households obtained enough food to avoid substantially disrupting 
their eating patterns or reducing food intake by using a variety of coping strategies, such 
as eating less varied diets, participating in Federal food assistance programs, or getting 
emergency food from community food pantries”; and very low food security is defined as 
“in these food-insecure households, normal eating patterns of one or more household 
members were disrupted and food intake was reduced at times during the year because 
they had insufficient money or other resources for food.” 
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Figure 3.7: Trends in Food Insecurity Among Senior Americans (Over Age 60) 
 
 
Source: Ziliak and Gundersen (2018), used with permission from the authors. Data from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), Food Security Supplement (FSS). 
Notes: MFI Rate looks at percent of households reporting marginal food insecurity, FI 
Rate looks at percent of households reporting food insecurity, and VLFS Rate looks at 
percent of households reporting very low food security. No. MFI looks at the number of 
seniors in millions reporting marginal food insecurity, No. FI looks the number of seniors 
in millions reporting food insecurity, and No. VLFS looks the number of seniors in 
millions reporting very low food security. Marginal food insecurity is defined as one or 
more affirmative responses out of eighteen questions asking about difficulty affording 
food, food insecurity is defined as three or more affirmative responses, and very low food 
security is defined as eight or more affirmative responses in households with children or 
six or more affirmative responses in households without.  
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Figure 3.8: Ratio of Odds Ratios for the Financial Security of Seniors Before and After 
Medicare Part D 
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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX 
In order to create my variable for prescription drug coverage, I used a series of 
questions asked by the HRS about respondents’ health insurance and prescription drug 
coverage. The survey uses the following pattern: first, asking if the respondent has a 
given type of health insurance, and then if that type of insurance has drug coverage or 
not. For years 2006-2014, the respondent is asked if they have drug coverage through an 
HMO/a Medicare Advantage Plan, Medicare Part D, “other” public source, or a private 
plan. 
Because the question on drug coverage was only asked of people who first said 
they had some type of insurance, I defaulted to coding everyone who did not answer the 
questions as “zero” for no drug coverage. Here, I’m making the reasonable assumption 
that people who do not have health insurance also do not have prescription drug 
coverage. This allows me to obtain information on coverage for the entire sample. 
One additional question concerning drug coverage was asked only of people who 
said “yes” to taking one of the following medications in a previous section on health: 
Blood pressure HBP meds; diabetes meds or insulin, heart attack angina meds or heart 
failure meds; stroke meds; and/or psychiatric meds. These people were asked first if they 
regularly took prescription medications, and second if their medications were completely 
covered by health insurance, mostly covered, only partially covered, or not covered at all 
by insurance. Most people answering this question were already asked about drug 
coverage when they were asked about insurance. However, a small portion of the 
uninsured (about four hundred) still reported having part of their drug costs covered 
despite not having insurance. These were likely to only have a small portion of their costs 
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covered through some type of drug discount program. Most minor programs that help the 
uninsured with medications do not greatly defray total costs. Thus, I only counted them 
as having coverage if they reported that all drug costs were covered, leaving those with 
only partial coverage and no insurance as not being covered. Those with partial drug 
coverage are too small in number to impact regression results. 
In years 1996-2004, fewer questions were asked concerning drug coverage. 
Respondents were asked if they had coverage from Medicare, an HMO, Medigap, or a 
private plan. The respondents who reported using prescription medications were still 
asked if they regularly took prescription medications and if their medications were 
completely covered by health insurance, partly covered, or not covered. Once again, I 
counted only those completely covered as having prescription drug coverage. 
Health insurance is constructed using the same variable tree. In the earlier years 
there is one question asking about health insurance, asking every respondent if they had it 
or not. In the later years I was able to obtain information on type of health insurance as 
well. Again, I defaulted to coding missing as zero because each health insurance question 
is asked only of those who don’t have the previous kind of health insurance.
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